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establishment of regional trade agreements (RTAs) such as the ASEAN+3, planning to 
establish an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) as well as negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements (BTAs).  This thesis hypothesizes that the philosophy of Asian values and the 
1997-1998 Asian economic crisis stimulated the creation of the ASEAN+3.  It is 
important to understand this philosophy for it is likely to influence the ASEAN+3 in the 
future.  The understanding of whether the Asian economic crisis spurred the creation of 
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…Asians demonstrate a cultural predisposition towards stable leadership 
rather than political pluralism, preferring continuity to change in 
government.  They have suggested, too, that Asians have an intuitive 
respect for authority and social harmony, and thus show a proclivity for 
consensus as opposed to a tendency towards dissent or confrontation.  The 
point was extended to suggest that Asians, therefore, would accept a 
strong, even harsh, government so long as its policies and actions 
continued to ‘deliver economic prosperity’.  Thus, the proponents of Asian 
values maintained that Asians tolerate, if not welcome, a broad and 
penetrating state and bureaucratic intervention in social and economic 
affairs, because Asians have a greater concern for economic well being 
than civil liberties and human rights.  Finally, Asians are supposedly 
communitarian rather than individualist, and place the welfare and 
collective good of the community over individual rights”- Khoo Boo Teik1 
A. MOTIVATION 
In the wake of the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, the leaders of East Asia 
came together to establish the ASEAN+3 forum2; a forum to accommodate thirteen 
countries heterogeneous in nature with diverse political, economic, social and cultural 
backgrounds.  Some political scientists interpreted the establishment of the ASEAN+3 as 
the emergence of a new form of regionalism3.  This new regionalism represents a clear 
break from the region’s strong history of multilateralism.  The countries of East Asia 
have also been exploring ways of expanding intra-regional trade including the 
establishment of regional trade agreements (RTAs) such as the ASEAN+3, planning to 
establish an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) as well as negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements (BTAs)4.   
 
                                                 
1 Khoo Boo Teik, “The Value(s) of a Miracle: Malaysian and Singapore Elite Constructions of Asia”, Asian 
Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, (June 1999), p. 182.  
2 Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) consists of 10 member states: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, 
The Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia.  The “+3” are the Northeast Asia 
countries of China, Japan and South Korea.  
3 Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN PLUS THREE: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?, Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3 
(2002), pp. 440-455. 
4 Charles Harvie and Hyun-Hoon Lee, “New Regionalism in East Asia: How Does It Relate to the East Asian 
Economic Development Model?”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2002), pp. 123-140.  
1 
The ASEAN+3 is an interesting case of institution building in that it is 
constructed around the core of an already existing institution, ASEAN, which was 
founded in 1967.  In this way, ASEAN appears to be evolving like the European Union 
(EU) in terms of economic cooperation.  With respect to security arrangements, however, 
the ASEAN+3 appears to be evolving more like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  This dual-track evolution is, to put it mildly, interesting.    
B. ASIAN VALUES 
What are Asian values?  Merely the mention of the philosophy of Asian values 
appears to spark disagreement among academicians and policy makers alike.  The 
strongest proponents argue that the philosophy of Asian values is a set of common 
principles among the Asian nations, while its detractors view it as a screen for such 
practices as corruption, paternalism, and cronyism.  To understand whether this 
philosophy influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3, we must first briefly review 
the philosophy itself. 
The most prominent of the advocates of Asian values can be grouped in three 
different schools namely, the Singapore school, the Mahathir school and the China 
school.5   
The Singapore school seeks to incorporate Confucianism into the philosophy of 
Asian values.6  Confucianism places great emphasis on forms of conduct within 
relationships, personal virtue, obedience to authority, family loyalties, and education.  
The current Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, stated that in order for 
Singapore to continue its success, correct economic policies alone are not enough.  Non-
economic values such as a sense of community and nationhood, a discipline and hard 
working people, strong moral values and family ties are also crucial.7  The Singapore 
school also gives priority to societal needs over individual rights.   
 
                                                 
5 P. Mendes, “Asian Values and Human Rights: Letting the Tigers Free”, 
[http://www.uottawa.ca/hrrec/publicat/asian_values.html], Accessed 15 June 2003. 
6 Michael D. Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate”, Asian Studies Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, 
(September 2000), pp. 309-334. 
7 Goh Chok Tong, “Social Values, Singapore Style”, Current History, (December 1994), p. 417. 
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Another aspect of the Asian values debate, which has attracted strong arguments 
from many western and some eastern commentators, is the system of government.  Lee 
Kuan Yew, ex-prime minister of Singapore, is one of the main architects of the Asian 
values debate and has argued for a paternalistic illiberal state.  He claimed that a 
paternalistic government is a necessity for Singapore to be able to take the strong 
measures to achieve economic growth.  The multicultural nature of society is another 
basis of argument that supports Singapore’s need for a strong paternalistic state in order 
to overcome racial, ethnic and religious tensions within the country.  
The Mahathir school of Asian values, named after the former Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, recognizes most of the Singapore school’s values but 
stresses the need for national stability and economic prosperity.  The Mahathir school 
also emphasizes the “Asia-as-civilization” thesis.8  Stability and enforced social cohesion 
in a heterogeneous society are viewed as crucial to economic development.  Once the 
values have been internalized, as this argument goes, society will be more effective and 
successful.  Another aspect of the Mahathir School is an emphasis on the work ethic.  
Mahathir’s “look east” policy clearly portrays the emphasis on the work ethic.  He called 
upon Malaysians to adopt the Japanese work ethic to prepare Malaysia for heavy 
industries, which he argues are more demanding and competitive9. 
The Chinese school of Asian values includes Confucianist principles and 
emphasizes the right to subsistence and economic development.  The Chinese model 
places little value on civil liberties and human rights, arguing that these rights can only be 
enjoyed once citizens are not poor or starving.  The right to subsistence and economic 
development is a precondition to all other rights.10  Therefore, in order to achieve 
economic development, the Peoples Republic of China stresses the importance of 
political stability as a precondition for economic development.11  Individuals must put the 
                                                 
8 Alan Dupont, “Is There an ‘Asian Way”?” Survival 38, No. 2, (Summer 1996), pp. 14-15. 
9 Khoo Boo Teik, “The Value(s) of a Miracle: Malaysian and Singaporean Elite Constructions of Asia”, Asian 
Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, (June 1999), pp. 181-192. 
10 P. Mendes, “Asian Values and Human Rights: Letting the Tigers Free”, 
[http://www.uottawa.ca/hrrec/publicat/asian_values.html], Accessed 15 June 2003 
11 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “ In Search of the ‘Asian Way’: Cultural Nationalism in Singapore and Malaysia”, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, (November 1998), pp. 54-73  
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state’s rights before their own.  The Chinese school also argues that, owing to tremendous 
differences in historical background, social systems, cultural traditions and economic 
development, countries differ in their understanding and practice of human rights.  It is 
unfair and “undemocratic” to treat the western notions of civil liberties and human rights 
as universal values, which all individuals are entitled to enjoy.  This argument is the basis 
of China’s Asian values debate12.  The three schools of Asian values as mentioned above 
could be merged to give a holistic picture of what is meant by Asian values.  The 
combinations of all the values explain that. 
The three schools of Asian values can be merged to provide a unified definition of 
the philosophy of Asian values.  The three schools share a common emphasis on, first, a 
respect for hierarchy and authority.  Second, the schools emphasize the need for 
centrality and cohesion of the family.  Third, social consensus is preferred over conflict in 
social relations.  Fourth, there is an emphasis on law and order and the desire not to have 
individual liberty undermine the security of the nation.  Fifth, political stability is 
important to promote economic and social development.  Sixth, traditional values and 
cultures, which do not impede development and progress, are to be maintained.  Finally, 
high moral and religious values, education, and self-discipline are crucial to economic 
development.13  In this thesis, we employ the common principles of the various schools 
when we refer to the philosophy of Asian values. 
The Asian values argument gained credibility during the 1980s and 1990s 
economic boom in East Asia.  However, in 1997, the philosophy of Asian values 
appeared to be severely discredited by the Asian economic crisis.  Some western 
observers argued that the policies of Asian governments, which mirrored the philosophy 
of Asian values, caused the economic crisis.  As such, the Asian economic crisis 
highlighted the hypocrisy of the philosophy of Asian values argument by exposing the 
underlying weaknesses of the Asian economies.  
 
                                                 
12 Michael D. Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate”, Asian Studies Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, 
(September 2000), p. 310. 
13 Alan Dupont, “Is there an ‘Asian Way”? Survival 38, No. 2, (Summer 1996), pp. 16-17. 
4 
In spite of the criticisms of the philosophy of Asian values, the proponents of 
Asian values, including the former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kwan Yew and 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia, still believe that the philosophy can 
assist the Asian economies in recovering from the economic crisis.  They claim that the 
western democracies have shifted too much in favor of individual rights and social 
entitlements over the rights of the community and the social obligations of the individual 
to the community.  This philosophical approach, in turn, hampered the economic 
performance of the state.  Proponents of Asian values argue that these values are the root 
of Asia’s remarkable postwar success.14  The Asian economic miracle provided the 
empirical evidence to support their arguments.  The Asian economic crisis, which ended 
in 1999, cannot be used, as this argument goes, to reject outright a philosophy that 
promoted several decades of economic growth.  
The proponents of liberal democracy rejected these arguments.  They argued that 
non-democratic government leaders were using the Asian cultural values argument to 
legitimize their non-democratic governance practices.  The Asian economic crisis, as this 
argument goes, exposed the hypocrisy of the proponents of the philosophy of Asian 
values.  Many western observers decried the Asian economies for “crony capitalism,” 
ridiculing this as an inevitable byproduct of the philosophy of Asian values.  Mortimer 
Zuckerman wrote, “Asian values have become Asian liabilities”15.  Mark R. Thompson 
furthered this line of reasoning; “the discourse contrasting the defects of ‘Western’ 
individualism and democracy with the virtues of ‘Asian’ communitarianism and good 
governance, which blossomed during East and Southeast Asia economic boom, has 
withered since the financial bust of 1997-1998”16.   
C. ASEAN+3 
At the same time that the proponents of Asian values were under attack and the 
Asian states were undergoing economic stress, the perception rose that the West was 
omic crisis.  Policy advice provided by international exacerbating the Asian econ
                                                 
14 Fareed Zakaria, “A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, (March-April 1994): 
pp. 109-127. 
15 Mortimer Zuckerman, “Japan Inc. Unravels: How Asian Values Have Becomes Asian Liabilities,” U.S. News 
& World Report, 17 August 1998. 
16 Mark R. Thompson, “Whatever Happened to ‘Asian Values’?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 
2001, pp. 154-165. 
5 
institutions, to include the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, appeared to 
be flawed.17  This belief fueled the “politics of resentment” among the East Asia states 
and led to the establishment of the ASEAN+3.18  The ASEAN+3 can be thought of as the 
Asian response to the Asian economic crisis.   
Some observers see the ASEAN+3 as a re-articulation of the philosophy of Asian 
values.  Mark Beeson noted:  
Certainly, the ASEAN+3 may provide a shell within which East Asian 
versions of capitalist organization may continue.  It may even provide a 
platform for a re-articulation of the so call ‘Asian values’ discourse which 
was such a prominent and distinctive part of Southeast Asia’s identity 
during the boom years19.   
Despite the severe economic crisis, the Asian values discourse, instead of 
withering away, may gain rather than lose momentum in the coming decades.20  Contrary 
to the negative notions portrayed by some observers, this thesis argues that the 
philosophy of Asian values has had some positive effects.  The establishment of the 
ASEAN+3 is the first step taken by leaders of East Asia to closer economic and social 
cooperation.  A more stable East Asia region would lessen the possibility of armed 
conflict between the member states.  Political stability and integration would also 
contribute to economic growth.  Detractors aside, this thesis argues that the philosophy of 
Asian values has promoted economic development and this raised the standards of living 
throughout the East Asian Region. 
This course of research will not only provide readers with a better understanding 
of the ASEAN+3 but also a systematic discussion of its potential and weaknesses.  The 
examination of the Asian economic crisis will also provide readers with  
                                                 
17 Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism” Asian Survey, Vol. XLII, No. 3, 
(May/June 2002), pp. 440-455. 
18 Richard Higgott, “The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment,” New Political Economy 
Vol. 3, No. 3, (November 1998), pp. 333-356.  ASEAN+3 consists of all Southeast Asia states (10 states), China, Japan 
and South Korea.  It is an economic cooperation between these states.  The establishment was proposed in 1997 but 
was formally established in 1999.  
19 Mark Beeson, ‘Southeast Asia and the Politics of Vulnerability’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, (2002) 
pp. 549-564.  
20 Anthony Milner, “What Happened to Asian Values”, in David Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds. “Beyond the 
Asia Crisis”, Rutledge, (1999), p. 13. 
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some lessons learned.  Furthermore, given the on-going debate on democracy and Asian 
governments, this research will also help readers to better understand Asian cultural 
values and whether Asian values are compatible with democratic governance. 
D. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis hypothesizes that the philosophy of Asian values and the 1997-1998 
Asian economic crisis stimulated the creation of the ASEAN+3.  If the philosophy of 
Asian values promoted the creation of the ASEAN+3, then it is important to understand 
this philosophy for it is likely to influence the ASEAN+3 in the future.  If the philosophy 
of Asian values is merely a set of values and not policies, then it is important to illustrate 
the independence of the ASEAN+3 from this set of “common values”.  Likewise, the 
future development of the ASEAN+3 is likely to depend upon economic as well as 
political issues.  Understanding whether the Asian economic crisis spurred the creation of 
the ASEAN+3 is crucial to determine whether the ASEAN+3 will play an economic role 
in the region. 
The intention is not to discuss in detail the entire Asian values debate and the 
Asian economic crisis.  The scope of this paper is limited to the debate after the 1997-
1998 Asian economic crisis and focuses on examining the effects of Asian values and the 
economic crisis on the creation of the ASEAN+3 and its activities. 
E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II discusses the establishment of ASEAN and its role in the East Asia 
region.  It also discusses the events that led to the creation of the ASEAN+3.  Chapter III 
reviews the literature of the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis and discusses whether 
Asian economic crisis influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  The Asian 
economic crisis adversely affected the East Asia countries, and appeared to lead these 
states to enhance economic cooperation.  The unanswered question is whether this 
cooperation was, in part, influenced by the philosophy of Asian values, and, if so, to what 
extent.   
Chapter IV reviews the literature on the philosophy of the Asian values.  The 
review of the literature provides an examination of the arguments for and against the 
philosophy of Asian values.  East Asia regionalism will be analyzed and discussed as to 
whether the philosophy of Asian values influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  
7 
Finally, Chapter V provides recommendations for policy options with respect to the 
further development of the ASEAN+3 and whether the philosophy of Asian values 
should play a role in this development.  Recommendations for future research on this 
subject are also discussed. 
8 
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN, ITS AIM AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN+3 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) has undergone various 
changes since its advent in August 1967.  The past three decades have seen ASEAN 
evolve into a respectable regional institution.  An understanding of ASEAN’s historical 
background and its current role is important since ASEAN is now one of the most 
important institutions in the Southeast Asia region.   
This chapter examines the establishment of ASEAN and the ASEAN+3.  It 
discusses the evolution of ASEAN and highlights some of the important aspects of the 
decision-making process adopted by ASEAN known as the “ASEAN Way”.  It also 
discusses the principle of non-interference professed by ASEAN in their intra and inter-
regional relationships.   
The first section of the chapter discusses the historical background of ASEAN 
with specific focus on its establishment and aims.  The second section examines the 
evolution of ASEAN from its five founding members to the present membership 
consisting of 10 states.  Next, the “ASEAN Way” is examined and discussed aspects of 
ASEAN security and economic cooperation.  Finally, the establishment of the ASEAN+3 
is discussed focusing on the Joint Statement made by the ASEAN leaders and the leaders 
of China, Japan and South Korea.  The final report of the East Asia Study Group and its 
recommendations is also examined.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Southeast Asia Region covers an area of 1,740,000 sq. mi.21 and consists of 
ten states: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, 
Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia.  These countries have diverse political, economic, social 
and cultural backgrounds.  The populations of most Southeast Asia states are multi-racial  
                                                 
21 [http://www.1upinfo.com/encyclopedia/S/SthEAs.html], Accessed 5 October 2003. 
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and multi-religious.  The total population of the region is approximately 500 million22.  
All the Southeast Asia states, except for Thailand, have one thing in common: they were 
at one time a colony of at least one western power.   
 
 
Figure 1.   The Southeast Asia Region. 
 
In the Post-World War II era, these states obtained their independence either 
through peaceful means or armed struggle.  Indonesia fought and obtained its 
independence from the Dutch in 1945.  Vietnam and Laos obtained their independence 
from the French also in 1945.  The Philippines obtained its independence from the United 
States in 1946.  Burma (Myanmar) became independent in 1948.  Cambodia negotiated 
its independence from the French in 1953 and Malaya (Singapore was part of Malaya) 
negotiated for its independence from the British in 1957, and after eight years of 
independence, Singapore opted for separation from Malaysia in 1965.  The last of the 
Southeast Asia states to negotiate its independence was Brunei in 198423.   
The post World War II period also saw the region divided by an ideological 
conflict between Communism and Capitalism and wars between Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia.  During this period, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 D. R. SarDesai, 1989, Southeast Asia Past & Present, San Francisco, Westview Press. 
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and the Philippines were non-communist states while Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma) 
and Cambodia were influenced and inclined towards Communism.  The political and 
economic situation was, to put it mildly, unstable.  There were many territorial disputes 
between the Southeast Asia states, some of which still remain unresolved to this day.     
The concern over the expansion of Communist ideology into Southeast Asia led 
the leaders of the Federation of Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines to form the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961.  The territorial claims over Sabah24 
between Malaysia and the Philippines, however, led to the demise of the ASA in 1962.  
Diplomatic ties between Kuala Lumpur and Manila were severed between 1962-66.  
Consequently, President Macapagal's idea of a grouping between Malaya, Philippines 
and Indonesia (MALPHILINDO) was stillborn.  Also, around the same time, there were 
numerous other conflicts, to include the confrontation25 between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965, the escalating war in Vietnam 
and the Cultural Revolution in China.  
In spite of all these problems, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN) was formed on 8 August 1967.  ASEAN may not have achieved a European 
Union (EU) style of integration.  However, ASEAN has successfully created an 
acceptable level of unity among its members.  Since its inception, ASEAN has played a 
major role in the establishment of other organizations such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN+3.  ASEAN’s success in creating unity from diversity 
can be attributed to the practice of the “ASEAN Way”26 in their intra and inter-regional 
relationships.  The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its members and  
                                                 
24 Sabah is a state situated on the Borneo Island.  Sabah opted to join the Federation of Malaysia in 1965.  The 
Philippines claim that Sabah is part of their territory inherited from the Sultanate of Sulu. 
25 The formation of the Malaysian federation (Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaya to create a new state: 
Malaysia) led to Indonesia’s violent opposition to the new state and the Western Powers’ attempts to deal with the 
resulting conflict. 
26 “ASEAN Way” is a distinct approach adopted by ASEAN leaders in their inter-state relations and regional 
cooperation.  It consists of avoidance of formal mechanisms and legalistic procedures for decision-making, and reliance 
on consensus to achieve goals.  It also emphasizes quiet diplomacy and rejection of adversarial posture in negotiations.   
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consensus decision-making process has been crucial to maintaining ASEAN cohesion.  
ARF, APEC, ASEM and the ASEAN+3 also adopted the “ASEAN WAY” in their 
decision-making process27.    
1. The Establishment of ASEAN and Its Aim 
The countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for 
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring 
their peaceful and progressive national development and ... they are 
determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference 
in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples. - Preamble 
to Bangkok Declaration28. 
The founding members of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand) established the association in 1967 with a vision that all the 
countries in Southeast Asia should cooperate actively towards peace, stability, progress 
and prosperity.  It was a bold vision because at that time the region was badly divided by 
ideological conflict and war.  Internal insurgencies and economic hardships forced 
countries in the region to spend a great deal of their scarce resources on defense and to 
depend on external powers for security and aid.  Territorial disputes and racial tensions 
created suspicion and aggravated distrust between neighbors and prolonged the 
fragmentation of Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN was founded to provide a framework and mechanism for regional 
cooperation.  The ASEAN Declaration was published in Bangkok on 8 August 1967.  
This Bangkok Declaration affirmed the founding members’ determination to ensure their 
stability and security from external interference and to preserve their national identities.  
ASEAN’s three aims are: 
• To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality 
and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and 
peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; 
• To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and 
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; [and] 
                                                 
27 Linjun Wu, “East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Policies and Practices”, Maryland Series in 
Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 5, 2000 (160).  
28 [http://www.aseansec.org as], Accessed 10 October 2003. 
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• To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of 
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields;...29 
The ASEAN declaration made clear that the association is open for participation 
to all states in the Southeast Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, 
principles and purposes.  It further stated the Association represents the collective will of 
the nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation.  
In order to achieve these aims, ASEAN adopted the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of its members.  ASEAN meetings are conducted in a consultative mode.  
Decisions are made only through consensus.  ASEAN also did not seek to resolve 
problems between its members by acting as an official arbitrator but rather by creating 
conditions for the members that are in dispute to compromise30.  A dispute-settlement 
mechanism, the High Council was established by the founding members of ASEAN in 
February 1976 through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, but this mechanism has 
never been used31.  ASEAN is indigenous and unique, for its creation and evolution are 
truly Southeast Asian and no models exist elsewhere in the world for emulation32. 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam 
attended some of the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings as Observers.  Burma (Myanmar), on 
the other hand, showed no interest in ASEAN membership due to its official stance as a 
neutral country.  North Vietnam, meanwhile, was at war with South Vietnam and the 
United States33. 
Unfortunately, the end of the wars in Indochina in 1975 did not remove the 
distrust and ideological animosity, let alone improve regional stability.  Worse still, in 
onflict raised regional tensions to a dangerous level and late 1978, the Kampuchean c
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 An example of such a situation is the “Sabah claim” between Malaysia and the Philippines.  Even though the 
problems have not been solved, Malaysia and the Philippines normalized their relations in May 1969. See also Amitav 
Acharya, 2000, “The Quest For Identity: International Relation of Southeast Asia”, Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, p. 93.  
31 Koro Bessho, 1999, Identities and Security in East Asia, IISS, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 41.  
32 Russell H. Fifield, “ASEAN: Image and Reality”, Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 12, Recent International 
Developments in Asia (December 1979), pp. 1199-1208. 
33 Amitav Acharya, 2000, “The Quest for Identity: International Relation of Southeast Asia”, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, p. 83. 
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consequently, robbed the Southeast Asia states of time as well as enormous human and 
economic resources that could otherwise have been used in national reconstruction and 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia34. 
On 7 January 1984, for the first time since its inception, ASEAN’s membership 
was expanded with the admission of Brunei Darussalam.  With a population of less than 
300,000 and sandwiched between Indonesia and Malaysia, ASEAN membership brought 
to Brunei Darussalam instant recognition and acceptance from ASEAN members35.  
Laos and Vietnam became official observers in ASEAN after their accession in 
1992 to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.  ASEAN took 
another step towards realizing the vision of ASEAN-10 (having all 10 countries in 
Southeast Asia in ASEAN) with the admission of Vietnam, in July 1995, as its seventh 
member36.  The admission of Vietnam was also a paradigm shift in Southeast Asia37, as 
ASEAN was originally formed to bring together the non-communist Southeast Asia 
states to counter the threat of communist expansion into the region. 
Laos was motivated by the admission of Vietnam to join ASEAN.  Until 1995, 
Laos took the position that it would join ASEAN together with Cambodia and Myanmar.  
At the 28th AMM in 1995, Cambodia was accorded Observer status after Cambodia 
acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.  Myanmar acceded to the Treaty in July 
1995 and was accorded Observer status at the 29th AMM in July 1996 in Jakarta38.  At 
the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in mid-December 1995, Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar submitted their respective applications for ASEAN membership in 1996.  Like 
Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar also wished to join ASEAN in 1997. 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 89.  
35 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Brunei: The ASEAN Connection”, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1983), pp. 723-
735.  
36 Leszek Buszynski, “ASEAN’s New Challenges”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Winter, 1997-1998), pp. 555-
577. 
37 Carolyn L. Gates and Mya Than, in “ASEAN Enlargement: An Introductory Overview”, ISEAS, Singapore, 
2001, p. 1.  
38 Ibid., pp. 557-560. 
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Laos and Myanmar were admitted as the eight and ninth members of ASEAN on 
23 July 199739.  Cambodia’s admission was delayed because of internal political 
developments in Cambodia.  Co-Prime Minister Hun Sen ousted Prime Minister Prince 
Norodom Ranarrith in a violent coup40.  The Sixth ASEAN Summit held in Hanoi on 16 
December 1998 decided to admit the Kingdom of Cambodia as the tenth member of 
ASEAN.  On 30 April 1999, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
admitted Cambodia as its tenth member, fulfilling its vision to establish an organization 
for all Southeast Asian countries.  
ASEAN is now comprised of the following countries: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam41. 
1. The “ASEAN Way” 
ASEAN is a unique organization as it is founded upon the principles of consensus 
and non-interference.  This distinctive nature of the “ASEAN Way” is stipulated in 
Chapter IV, Articles 13 to 17 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.  The accession of 
this treaty is a precondition for admission to ASEAN. 
The Treaty outlines the following principles.  The first is mutual respect for 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of all nations.  The second is the right of 
every state to lead its national existence free from external experience, subversion and 
coercion.  The third is non-interference in the internal affairs of one another.  The fourth 
is the settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means.  Finally, the fifth is the 
renunciation of the threat of the use of force42.  The treaty also provides a mechanism for 
a formal dispute settlement known as the High Council.  The role of this council is to find 
ways and means to resolve disputes reported by members.  The council is encouraged to 
conduct direct negotiation between the disputed parties.  It is also required to take 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Amitav Acharya, 2000, “The Quest for Identity: International Relation of Southeast Asia”, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, p. 135. 
41 Carolyn L. Gates and Mya Than, in “ASEAN Enlargement: An Introductory Overview”, ISEAS, Singapore, 
2001, pp. 1-26.  
42 Amitav Acharya, 2001, “Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order”, London and New York: Routledge, p. 47. 
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appropriate action such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation to resolve 
disputes.  However, to this date, this mechanism has never been activated or utilized by 
any member of ASEAN, despite many disputes that have arisen between its members 
since 1967.  Most of the disputes between ASEAN’s members were resolved between the 
parties in an informal way without interference from third parties43.   
In order to clearly explain the distinctiveness of the ASEAN Way as compared to 
the doctrine of non-interference, non-intervention and pacific settlement of disputes that 
are cardinal principles of the Westphalia international system, Noordin Sopiee lists 
thirteen principles which he claims to be the core principles of the ASEAN Way.  These 
principles are:44:  (1) Rejection of internal and external collective military pacts; (2) 
rejection of emphasis on peace through military deterrence; (3) the advocacy and practice 
of the ‘true peace’ measure: the building of confidence, trust, predictability, goodwill and 
friendship, national resilience, a rich web of productive and warm bilateral relations; (4) 
the principle of actively seeking and maximizing solidarity, common ground, agreement 
and harmony; (5) the principle of sensitivity; politeness, non-confrontation and 
agreeability, emphasizing ‘the ability to agree to disagree without being disagreeable’; (6) 
the principle of decision making by consensus; (7) the principle of mutual caring; (8) the 
principle of integrity; (9) the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs; (10) the 
preference for quite diplomacy and aversion to excessive public washing of dirty linen 
and diplomacy through the media and mass mobilization; (11) the principle of 
pragmatism; (12) the preference for content rather than form, substance rather than 
process, non-addiction Cartesian and to legalism; and (13) the principle of egalitarianism.  
Amitav Acharya, a scholar in Southeast Asia studies, commented that while the 
list is repetitive and debatable, it is a useful list of the most salient aspects of the ASEAN 
Way45.  Critics have argued that the ASEAN Way is not an effective conflict resolution 
method but a method of conflict avoidance and has led to conflicts being “swept under 
                                                 
43 Amitav Acharya, 2000, “The Quest for Identity: International Relation of Southeast Asia”, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 127-128. 
44 Noodin Sopiee, “ASEAN Towards 2020: Strategic Goals and Critical Pathway”, Paper Presented to the 2nd 
ASEAN Congress, Kuala Lumpur, 20-23 July 1997, p. 9. 
45 Amitav Acharya, 2001, “Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order”, London and New York: Routledge, p. 75. 
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the carpet”.  The ASEAN Way is also seen as a mechanism to “buy time”.  The 
expansion of ASEAN to incorporate the Indochina states has posed a test to the durability 
and effectiveness of the ASEAN way.  The larger membership in ASEAN makes its 
decision-making process more cumbersome and possibly less effective.  Whether this 
occurs remains to be seen.  
2. ASEAN Security 
With regards to the security role of ASEAN, ASEAN initially did not assume a 
specific security-related role and rejected becoming a military alliance46.  ASEAN has 
taken a neutral stance; a stance which can be seen in ASEAN security-related 
initiatives47.  During the Cold War era, in order to maintain its neutrality and its principle 
of non-interference, ASEAN opted to be a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.  
Therefore, the security of ASEAN members, to an extent, relied on outside assistance 
through bilateral arrangements48.  The United States and ASEAN member’s former 
colonial powers were the primary guarantors of ASEAN members’ security.  Besides 
external help, ASEAN members also relied on bilateral ties among its members.  Early 
forms of bilateral ties were geared towards border region insurgencies.  However, with 
the collapse of communist insurgencies in the region, military cooperation has taken 
shape in the form of intelligence sharing and joint exercises and training.49    
In July 1993, the security outlook of the Southeast Asia region changed when 
ASEAN formally proposed the establishment the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the 
region’s only multilateral security framework50.  The ARF was established in 1994.  It 
draws together 23 countries, which have a bearing on the security of the Asia-Pacific 
region.  It comprises the 10 ASEAN member states, the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners51, 
one ASEAN observer (PNG); as well as South Korea and Mongolia. 
                                                 
46 Koro Bessho, 1999. Identities and Security in East Asia, IISS, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 41-42.  
47 Such as the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976.   
48 Ibid. 
49 Amitav Acharya, 2002, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: The Association of Southeast Asia Nations: 
‘Security Community’ and ‘Defence Community’?, Singapore: Times Academic Press, p. 74.  
50 Koro Bessho, 1999. Identities and Security in East Asia, IISS, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 70.  
51 ASEAN dialogue partners are, Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and 
the United States. 
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The ASEAN Regional Forum is the principal forum for security dialogue in Asia.  
The ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues, which underpin the 
region's security architecture.  The ARF is premised on the idea drawn from the ASEAN 
experience, or that a process of dialogue can produce qualitative improvements in 
political relationships.  It provides a setting in which members can discuss current 
regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security 
in the region. 
The ARF is characterized by consensus decision-making and minimal 
institutionalization.  The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out a three-stage, evolutionary 
approach to the ARF's development, moving from confidence-building to preventive 
diplomacy and, in the long term, towards a conflict resolution capability52.  In its first ten 
years, the ARF has made modest gains in building a sense of strategic community and, 
more recently, it has contributed to the region's counter-terrorism efforts.  However, 
efforts to develop tools of preventive diplomacy and conflict management are still at an 
early stage.  While the ARF continues to focus on confidence building measures, ARF 
members have also agreed that preventive diplomacy should proceed in tandem with 
these efforts, particularly in areas of overlap between confidence building and preventive 
diplomacy.  
Preventive diplomacy tools accepted by ARF members to date include an 
enhanced role for the ARF Chair in coordinating ARF positions so as to strengthen the 
ARF's ability to respond to situations affecting the security of ARF members during the 
period between Ministerial meetings.  Another mechanism is an ARF Register of Experts 
and Eminent Persons which, when operational, will provide a pool of expertise on 




                                                 
51 Koro Bessho, 1999. Identities and Security in East Asia, IISS, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 70.  
52 Ibid., pp. 70-74. 
53 Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the “ASEAN Way”, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 10 (October 
1997), pp. 961-978. 
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3. ASEAN Economic Cooperation 
When ASEAN was established, trade among the member countries was small 
relative to trade outside the region.  Estimates between 1967 and the early 1970s showed 
that the share of intra-ASEAN trade from the total trade of the member countries was 
between 17.2 and 20.9 percent54.  Thus, some of the earliest economic cooperation 
schemes of ASEAN were aimed at addressing this situation.  One of these was the 
Preferential Trading Arrangement of 1977 (PTA), which accorded tariff preferences for 
trade among ASEAN economies.  Ten years later, an Enhanced PTA Programme was 
adopted at the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila to increase intra-ASEAN trade.  
However, no progress was evident by the end of the decade.  In spite of the poor 
economic cooperation record, ASEAN leaders in 1991 reached an agreement on the idea 
of the establishment of a free trade area. 
During the fourth ASEAN summit held in Singapore in January 1992, the 
ASEAN Heads of Government signed the Singapore Declaration of 1992 and the 
Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation.  One of the major 
outcomes of this Summit was the decision to set up the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
within 15 years.  The strategic objective of AFTA is to increase the ASEAN region’s 
competitive advantage.  Member countries also signed the Agreement on the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, which is the main instrument to establish 
the AFTA55.  The Fourth Summit also enhanced the role of the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN and enlarged the functions of the ASEAN Secretariat to carry out its new 
mandate56. 
Initially, the AFTA proposal envisaged tariffs among ASEAN countries falling to 
between zero to five per cent within 15 years from January 1993.  However, this deadline 
was brought forward by five years to 200357.  This was in response to the establishment 
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of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)58 in 1989 to further enhance economic 
growth and prosperity for the region and to strengthen the Asia-Pacific community.  
Since its inception, APEC has worked to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers across the 
Asia-Pacific region, creating efficient domestic economies and dramatically increasing 
exports59.  Given the smaller size of AFTA, if it wants to succeed, it must be a step ahead 
of APEC in the area of tariff reduction.  However, some flexibility was granted to the 
new members of ASEAN and the deadline was extended to 200860.  AFTA is expected to 
be an important tool in maintaining ASEAN’s cohesion and preserving ASEAN identity.  
In 1997, the ASEAN leaders adopted ASEAN Vision 2020, which called for 
ASEAN partnership in dynamic development aimed at forging closer economic 
integration within the region.  The vision statement also resolved to create a stable, 
prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region, in which there is a free 
flow of goods, services, investments, capital, and equitable economic development and 
reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities.  The Hanoi Plan of Action, adopted in 
1998, serves as the first in a series of plans of action leading up to the realization of the 
ASEAN vision61. 
In addition to trade and investment liberalization, regional economic integration is 
being pursued through the development of Trans-ASEAN transportation networks 
consisting of major inter-state highway and railway networks, principal ports and sea 
lanes for maritime traffic, inland waterway transport, and major civil aviation links.  
ASEAN is promoting the interoperability and interconnectivity of the national 
telecommunications equipment and services.  The building of Trans-ASEAN energy 
networks, which consist of the ASEAN Power Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline 
Projects, are also ongoing.  
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of America, Vietnam. 
59 [http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/about_apec.html], Accessed 6 October 2003. 
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The ASEAN Vision 2020 affirmed an outward-looking ASEAN playing a pivotal 
role in the international community and advancing ASEAN’s common interests.  It has 
made major strides in building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region and 
shall continue to accord them a high priority.  Cooperation with other East Asian 
countries has accelerated with the holding of an annual dialogue among the leaders of 
ASEAN, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.  In 1997, a joint statement between 
ASEAN and each of them was signed providing for framework for cooperation towards 
the 21st century62.  This marked the establishment of the ASEAN+3 Summit.  In 
November 1999, to further strengthen their cooperation, the leaders of ASEAN, China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea issued a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation 
outlining the areas of cooperation among them63.  The most recent development on 
ASEAN+3 cooperation during the writing of this paper is the 7th ASEAN+3 summit held 
in Bali, Indonesia on 7 October 2003. 
D. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN +3 COOPERATION   
1. Introduction 
The idea of establishing a regional cooperation between Southeast Asia states and 
the Northeast Asia states was initially mooted by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamed in his proposal for an East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) in 1990.  The 
United States and non-East Asia countries opposed this idea64 because it was perceived 
that it would undermine APEC.  Japan, as the key actor in the proposed grouping, was 
reluctant to affirm its support due to concerns that it would antagonize the United States.  
In order to save the idea, ASEAN proposed then that an East Asia Economic Caucus 
(EAEC) would function within the APEC framework.  However, APEC, gaining its 
reputation as an important regional institution, overshadowed the development of EAEC.  
The revival of Asian regionalism came during the preparation for the ASEM that 
was to be held in Bangkok, Thailand in 1995.  ASEAN leaders decided to invite the 
leaders of Japan, China and South Korea to join them at the meeting.  During this  
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meeting, these leaders agreed to continue to meet as a group in the future.  The meeting 
of ASEAN senior officials and the three Northeast Asia states was held in 1996 and plans 
were made for a meeting of economic ministers and foreign ministers in 1997.  
Subsequently, the heads of state and the governments of China, Japan and Korea 
were invited to the second ASEAN Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997.  This was 
later known as the ASEAN+3 summit.  This meeting was followed by separate 
“ASEAN+1” meetings between ASEAN leaders with each of the leaders of China, Japan 
and South Korea.  
The ASEAN+3 summit was aimed at enhancing regional cooperation to cope with 
the monetary and economic crisis that erupted the East Asia Region in 1997.  The 
ASEAN+3 leaders further strengthened the ASEAN+3 process with the issuance of a 
Joint Statement on East Asia cooperation in 199965.   
2. Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation 
At the third ASEAN Informal Summit in Manila in 1999, the ASEAN+3 leaders 
issued a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation.  The statement reflected a 
commitment to strengthen cooperation and collaboration in East Asia in priority areas of 
shared interest and concern especially in economic, monetary and financial cooperation, 
social and human resources development, science and technology, culture and 
information and development cooperation66. 
At their first meeting in Bangkok in July 2000, the ASEAN+3’s foreign ministers 
adopted a Modality for the Implementation of the Joint Statement with a view to ensure 
coordination and coherence while allowing for flexibility in moving the process forward.  
In terms of coordination, it was agreed that countries chairing summits would compile 
and consolidate reports on progress made in various areas of cooperation, which would 
be submitted for the consideration of the ASEAN+3 summits.  The foreign ministers also 
agreed to meet annually with a view to strengthening cooperation within the ASEAN+3 
framework. 
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3. ASEAN+3 Cooperation 
To date there have been seven ASEAN+3 summit meetings (including the 
ASEAN+3 Study Group on the Facilitation and Promotion of the Exchange of People and 
Human Resource Development meeting) and five ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers meetings 
with the latest being the ASEAN+3 summit meeting 2003 held on the 7 and 8 October 
2003 in Bali, Indonesia67. 
ASEAN+3 cooperation has been most prominent in the areas of economics and 
finance.  ASEAN officials in areas such as science and technology, agriculture and 
forestry, labor and tourism have expressed interest in having their own ASEAN+3 
processes.  Priorities for regional cooperation activities among the ASEAN+3 countries 
include enhancing self-help and support mechanisms, monitoring capital flows, and 
establishing mechanisms for closer and more effective economic review and policy 
dialogue68. 
The most successful ASEAN+3 cooperation is the Chiang Mai Initiative, which 
was announced by the ASEAN+3 finance ministers, convening in May 2000.  They 
intended to cooperate in four principal areas: monitoring capital flows, regional 
surveillance, swap networks, and training personnel69.  The initiative involves an 
expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement that would include ASEAN countries, China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea70. 
4. East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and East Asia Study Group 
As proposed by Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung at the ASEAN+3 Summit in 
Hanoi in 1998, the ASEAN+3 leaders agreed to establish the East Asia Vision Group 
(EAVG) and East Asia Study Group (EASG).  EAVG consists of eminent intellectuals 
from ASEAN countries, Japan, China and South Korea, while the EASG consists of 
government officials.  These groups were established in December 1998 and November 
ng-term cooperation.   2000 respectively to discuss lo                                                 
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Prior to the submission of their final report to the ASEAN+3 summit, the EASG 
conducted six meetings.  The final report of the EASG provides an assessment of two 
broad categories71: first, to assess the 57 concrete measures recommended by the EAVG 
in its report and second, to explore the idea and implications of an East Asia summit72.  
The EASG was officially launched on 17 March 2001 and consists of fourteen members: 
13 senior officials from the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan and Korea along 
with the secretary-general of ASEAN.   
Regarding their assessment of the recommendations made by the EAVG, the 
EASG finds that the recommendations will be useful in realizing the East Asian vision of 
peace, prosperity and progress.  Out of the 57 concrete measures recommended by the 
EAVG, the EASG has selected 26 implementable concrete measures with high priority. 
The final report also makes its assessment of the implications of an East Asian 
summit.  Their findings are as follows.  First, the ASEAN+3 evolved into the East Asian 
summit, therefore, it is important for East Asia to continue working towards a durable 
institutional framework for region-wide dialogue and cooperation.  Second, the East Asia 
cooperation is both inevitable and necessary and an East Asian community will evolve 
over time.  However, there are concerns that ASEAN will be marginalized if the 
transition towards an East Asia Summit moves too fast; and that the ASEAN+3 
framework remains the only credible and realistic vehicle to advance the form and 
substance of regional cooperation in East Asia.  The East Asia Summit should be part of 
an evolutionary and systematic process.   
The EASG makes the following recommendations.  First, in order to implement 
the 26 implementable concrete measures with high priority successfully, there must be a 
strong political commitment by all parties.  The EASG also recommended that East Asia 
countries prepare action plans on each concrete measure and have productive discussions 
on those plans within the ASEAN+3 process. 
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This chapter has discussed the formation and evolution of ASEAN.  It also 
examines ASEAN’s security and economic cooperation.  It explains the ASEAN Way 
and the principle of non-interference adopted by ASEAN in its intra and inter-regional 
relationship. 
Finally, this chapter discusses the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  It explains the 
development of the ASEAN+3 from an idea into reality.  From the first discussion of 
creating an institutionalize cooperation until the establishment of the working group, 
positive responses to the materialization of the joint statement of East Asia cooperation 
has been progressing well especially in the areas of economics and finance.  
Examining ASEAN and the ASEAN+3 together, it can be argued that ASEAN 
norms and practices would influence the future undertakings of the ASEAN+3.  On the 
other hand, ASEAN norms and practices would also be influenced by the norms and 
practices of the Northeast Asia countries.  As stressed by the EASG that East Asia 
cooperation is inevitable and necessary, and it is only a matter of time before an East 
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III. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE OF THE ASIAN 
ECONOMIC CRISIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last three decades, the world has witnessed two major distinct economic 
events that made the East Asia Region the focal point of the world agenda: the Asian 
economic miracle and the Asian economic crisis.  During the period when the growth 
rates of many East Asian states averaged six to ten percent per annum, many observers 
were amazed by this event to the extent they labeled it an “economic miracle”.  The 
performance of the East Asian economies stood in stark contrast to the long-held 
assumption that Asian cultures lacked the capacity to generate sufficient economic 
growth73.  As the economic success of East Asian states became the envy of other 
developing states, the idea of an Asian economic development model different from 
traditional Western development models grew.  To some extent, the idea of an Asian 
economic development model challenged the long-standing free market economic model 
championed by the West.  Underlying the rise of the Asian model was the philosophy of 
Asian values with its emphasis on strong government and restricted civil liberties, and 
state-determined economic development. 
However, in 1997, the East Asia economy was severely affected by the Asian 
financial crisis, which started with the collapse of Thai’s baht.  This financial crisis 
quickly spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea.  Singapore and 
Taiwan were also affected, but their currencies suffered minor devaluations74.  The Asian 
financial crisis later led to an economic crisis.  Some observers argued that the Asian 
financial crisis finally put to rest the myth that the region’s success was the result of a 
unique system of capitalism rooted in Asian values.  These observers argued that the 
unique system of Asian capitalism bred cronyism and corruption, and that the economic 
miracle merely hid the corrupt nature of the Asian development model75.    
                                                 
73 Lucian W. Pye, 2000, “Asian Values”: From Dynamos to Dominos? In Cultures Matters: How Values Shape 
Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, New York: Basic Books, p. 244. 
74 Y. C. Richard Wong, “Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis”, Cato Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1999), 
Hong Kong: Cato Institute, p. 391.  
75 Ibid. 
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The Asian economic development model must not be dismissed outright on the 
basis of a short period of poor economic performance.  The fact remains that this model, 
in general, appears to have improved the economic status of its East Asian adherents.  
Economic growth in most East Asia states lasted for more that a decade before it was 
severely affected by the economic crisis.  The development record of the “Four Tigers” 
(Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) stands out relative to the performance 
of other developing countries. 
A review of the Asian economic crisis literature will provide readers with 
arguments pertaining to the causes of the crisis and the debate for and against the Asian 
economic development model.  The focus of this chapter is to examine the relationship 
between the Asian economic crisis and the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  In doing so, 
an overview of the Asian economic crisis in the second section of this chapter is briefly 
provided.  The third section discusses some of the perceived factors that caused the Asian 
economic crisis, and finally, the relationship between the Asian economic crisis and the 
ASEAN+3 is examined.   
There is a vast amount of literature on this subject of the Asian economic crisis.  
The focus of this thesis, however, is on those aspects of the crisis that influenced the 
establishment of the ASEAN+3.  
B. OVERVIEW OF THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Prior to the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, the East Asian region had 
experienced a decade of, to put it mildly, outstanding economic growth.  Some observers 
believed that the Asian economic growth would continue in the future, as the economic 
fundamentals were strong, even though there were some warning signs of problems but 
nothing to indicate impending disaster76.  This view was proven wrong when the Asian 




                                                 
76 Hali J. Edison, Pongsak Luangaram and Marcus Miller, “Asset Bubbles, Leverage and ‘Lifeboats’: Elements of 
the East Asian Crisis”, The Economic Journal, 110, (January 2000), pp. 309-334. 
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1. The Asian Economic Model 
In order to understand the reasons behind the Asian economic crisis, one must 
first understand the fundamental principles of the Asian economic development model.  
The fundamental principles of the Asian economic development model can be 
summarized as follows.77 
First, the Asian economic model stresses the need for sound macroeconomic 
management.  A stable business environment with relatively low inflation encourages 
investment in long-gestation fixed assets projects.  Prudent and sustainable fiscal policies 
actively complement other measures aimed at equitably sharing the rewards from higher 
growth.  Exchange rate policies underpin export competitiveness and financial 
development and liberalization maximize domestic savings and promotes efficient 
allocation of resources and integration with the global financial system.  Government 
should also attempt to minimize price distortions, and undertake actions to support the 
spread of primary and secondary schooling as well as the creation of skills to buttress an 
outward looking development push. 
Second, the Asian development model emphasizes the need for a bureaucracy 
able to conceive and implement the designs of a strong state.  Control is centralized; 
minimizing the need for coordination across multiple layers of government.  This 
principle was adopted especially in Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.  Close 
cooperation is also needed between the government and business sectors in the economic 
development of the country78.  Third, government intervention is used to quicken the 
pace of industrialization, and promote industrial exports.  East Asian governments also 
made selective use of tariffs, export incentives in the form ranging from moral suasion to 
subsidies and mild financial repression in order to provide lower cost financing to 
industry.  Finally, the fourth principle is a pragmatic approach in the economic 
development strategy.  The measures taken by the government are flexible and will be  
                                                 
77 Shahid Yusuf, 2001, “The East Asian Miracle at the Millennium” in Rethinking the East Asia Miracle, eds., 
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Izumi Ohno, London: Routlegde and World Bank, 1993, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, 
New York: Oxford University Press.   
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abandoned if the purpose is not being fulfilled.  In other words, the Asian development 
model was based upon the assumption that market outcomes could be improved through 
the manipulation of incentives by the government.   
Other observers believed that the high economic growth achieved by East Asia 
states during the miracle years were the result of a blend of high savings and investment 
rates, autocratic political systems, export-oriented businesses, restricted domestic 
markets, government capital allocation, and controlled financial systems79.  Harvie and 
Lee suggested that the East Asia economies achievement bears strong resemblance to 
Gerschenkron’s theory of “economic backwardness”.  East Asian governments 
successfully undertook the radical measures to promote development through 
institutional innovations and controlled capital markets.  Beside these factors, economic 
growth has resulted from demographic changes in these countries.  There has been a 
significant increase in the working age group in these countries as the result of the fall in 
birth and death rates in the early 1970s and early 1990s.  The sound work ethic of the 
Asian people also contributed to the economic development of their countries.  Asian 
people are diligent as proven by their long working hours and high saving rates.  Such 
diligence in combination with the low costs of labor employment made East Asia 
economies attractive to foreign investors.  Coupled with high rates of savings, these 
demographic changes spurred economic growth.80. 
Whether the Asian economic model is actually unique is still a matter of debate.  
Some view the swift recovery of the Asian economies from the crisis as evidence of the 
long-standing strength of the model, while others view it as an outcome of the reforms 
urged by international financial institutions.  To understand this debate, we must first 
discuss the crisis event itself and its impact on the East Asian region. 
2. The Asian Crisis 
Many observers argue that the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) began in May 1997 
with the speculative attack on the Thai Baht.  As the Baht depreciated, foreign investors 
pulled capital from Thailand, further depressing the Baht’s value.  The devaluation of the 
                                                 
79 Alan C. Shapiro, Multinational Financial Management, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999, Chapter 
1. 
80 Charles Harvie and Hyun-Hoon Lee, “New Regionalism in East Asia: How Does it Relate to the East Asian 
Economic Development Model?, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2002), pp. 123-140.    
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Baht exposed the underlying weaknesses of the Thai economy, to include over 
investment, corruption, and cronyism.  The Thai government assisted in the devaluation 
of the Baht by claiming it was the action of foreign speculators, statements which only 
exacerbated the outflow of capital.  As Thailand’s currency rapidly depreciated, it placed 
pressure on other regional currencies; pressure that soon led to the selling of the 
currencies and a flight to quality; namely the U.S. Dollar, English Pound, and German 
Deutschmark.  The AFC reached its peak where local banks, unable to collect on risky 
loans, collapsed.  The collapse of the banking systems led to a regional recession called 
the Asian economic crisis. 
By the end of 1997, the region was in the grip of a full-blown economic crisis.81  
Exports and imports dramatically declined, investment fell significantly; excess capacity 
increased, and profits declined and unemployment grew.  For many of the countries in the 
region, economic activity, as measured by Gross Domestic Product, fell (Table 1).  
Despite the severity of the crisis, by early 1999, the Asian economies began to 
recover and towards the end of 1999 managed to attain a growth rate of 4.1 percent.  In 
2000, East Asian economic growth averaged 6 percent82, which is nearly the same 
average growth rate during the economic miracle period.  The Asian economic crisis is 
believed to have ended in 1998, having caused a tremendous destruction of wealth, 
significant unemployment, and increase in poverty.  Decades of social progress were 
reversed.  It also caused political instability to erupt in several of the countries.  New 
governments emerged in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand.  The social after-shock 
of the economic crisis is still being felt in 2003.  It is unfortunate that the crisis also 
caused increased distrust among Asian societies toward western societies and 
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Table 1. Macroeconomic Adjustment of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand – 1993-200084 (After: Source: Asian Development 
Bank). 
 
Growth Rate  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Indonesia         



















Exports (%) 6.81 9.94 7.72 7.56 7.80 11.18 -32.06 27.1 
Import (%) 4.65 20.30 20.94 6.86 14.72 -5.29 -40.90 4.1 
Korea         



















Exports (%) 11.30 16.08 24.59 11.21 21.44 13.25 16.35 19.9 
Import (%) 6.21 21.58 22.36 14.25 3.18 -22.40 28.94 34.0 
Malaysia         



















Exports (%) 11.54 21.91 18.96 9.23 5.42 -0.21 13.76 16.1 
Import (%) 15.04 25.64 23.7 4.89 5.74 -19.37 11.58 25.7 
Philippines         



















Exports (%) 6.26 19.77 12.04 15.40 17.15 -21.04 3.65 8.7 
Import (%) 11.48 14.51 16.03 16.73 13.49 -14.71 -2.79 2.1 
Thailand         



















Exports (%) 12.74 14.25 15.50 -5.53 8.41 6.72 8.86 19.5 
Import (%) 11.78 15.75 19.87 -0.52 -11.38 -22.28 20.24 24.6 
 
C. CAUSES OF ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
There have been many studies attempting to determine the causes of the Asian 
economic crisis.  The findings have been divisive among economists.  Even the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been alleged for wrongly interpreting the causes 
                                                 
84 Adopted from Yung Chul Park and Jong Wha Lee, “Financial Crisis and Recovery: Pattern of Adjustment in 
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of the crisis, which led to flawed policy advice that exacerbate the crisis85.  This section 
highlights the different views of scholars and economists about the cause of the Asia 
economic crisis. 
According to the IMF’s first deputy managing director, Stanley Fischer, most of 
the problems originated locally.  However, he also pointed out that advanced economies 
and global financial markets contributed significantly to the build-up of the imbalances 
that eventually led to the economic crisis.  He identified the following key domestic 
factors that led to the economic crisis:86 
[F]irst, the failure to dampen overheating pressures that had become 
increasingly evident in Thailand and many other countries in the region 
and were manifested in large external deficits and property and stock 
markets bubbles; second, the maintenance of pegged exchange rate regime 
for too long, which encouraged external borrowing and led to excessive 
exposure to foreign exchange risk in both the financial and corporate 
sectors; third, lax prudential rules and financial oversight, which led to a 
sharp deterioration  in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios… 
Other observers have different views regarding the causes of the Asian economic 
crisis.  Some believe that the economic upheaval in Asia was due to the corruption and 
incompetence of Asian governments and certainly not due to the weaknesses in the 
architecture of global finance87.  Krugman, a well-known economist, initially in his crony 
capitalism analysis, supported this view and believed that the Asian economic crisis was 
the problem of moral hazard in lending, mainly domestic lending.  However, he later 
changed his view and stated that the crisis was caused by market panic88.    
Volker, former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Board, rejected the 
crony capitalism argument.  He argues that crony capitalism is bad regardless of where it 
exists but it did not cause the Asian financial crisis.  He stated,       
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International financial crises, I might even say domestic financial crises, 
are built into human genome.  When we map the whole thing, we will find 
something there call greed and something called fear and something call 
hubris.  That is all you need to produce international financial crises in the 
future.  I have not seen anything to raise any doubts about that.89 
Park notes that in 1996, the capital inflow into Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
South Korea was $93 billion.  However, in the following year, 1997, capital outflow 
reached a total amount of $105 billion, equivalent to 11 percent of the total combined 
GDP of the states mention above90.  The reversal in the capital flows precipitated the 
Asian currency crisis and eventually led to the economic crisis.  He further argues that 
one of the main causes of the Asian economic crisis is the increasing globalization in the 
world economy.  The East Asia countries were too slow to appreciate fully the new 
challenges posed by the rapidly globalizing financial markets and to formulate 
appropriate responses.  Market reaction is much faster and the magnitude is much bigger 
due to globalization.  Consequently, globalization magnifies the cost and consequences of 
bad policies and weak, inefficient institutions.  
Furman and Stiglitz in their argument regarding the causes of the Asian economic 
crisis make three hypothesis91: (1) the so-called East Asian system was ill-suited to cope 
with changes in the world around it, especially the increased integration of international 
capital markets, which increased vulnerability; (2) policies that worked well at an earlier 
stage of development were ill-suited for a more advanced situation; and (3) the East 
Asian economies abandoned the policies that had served them so well in the past.   
They also argued that the most plausible explanations of the Asian economic 
crisis rely on some combination of these three hypotheses.  
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Whitt92 argues that there are three possible interpretations of what caused the 
Asian economic crisis.  The first emphasizes internal problems in the countries affected 
by the crisis, mainly fragility in their financial sectors resulting from lax government 
regulation and over reliance on government guarantees.  The second interpretation 
emphasizes the problem of the fragility in the international capital markets.  Even a 
modest liquidity problem in one country (Thailand) triggered a financial panic that spread 
to neighboring countries.  Third, the role of external shocks makes Whitt’s argument 
different from other commentators.  Whitt further argues that the crisis was set off by at 
least three external shocks: the 1994 devaluation by China, the severe recession in Japan, 
and a sharp rise of the dollar in foreign exchange markets that began in 1995.  These 
shocks were believed to have the potential to cut into the export performance of the Asian 
countries. 
Another theory regarding the caused of the Asian economic crisis is the 
“Contagion Syndrome”.  The word “contagion” denotes the spillover effects across 
countries93.  Movements of one country’s exchange rates, stock prices, and interest rates 
correlated with another country’s movement are interpreted as contagion.  The channel of 
contagion can be the fundamental linkage among economies and factors unrelated to 
fundamentals.  Fundamental linkages include both “real” and “financial” linkages, while 
unrelated linkage concern the effect of herding.  During the Asian financial crisis, the 
contagion syndrome was triggered when Thai Baht was devalued, which led investors to 
withdraw their capital from the region.  Developments in Thailand caused investors to 
examine more critically the vulnerabilities elsewhere in the region, which they previously 
ignored.  Once the investors found weaknesses in the financial system of other countries 
and lost confidence that foreign exchange reserves would cover short-term external debt, 
both foreign and domestic investors quickly withdrew their investments.  This is what 
caused the full-scale financial panic that hit Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and to a 
lesser extent, Malaysia94.  
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In support of the contagion theory, Pilbeam argues that although there were signs 
of deterioration in the macroeconomic fundamentals, these were not sufficient to explain 
the magnitude of the financial crisis.  The lax lending by local banking systems fuelled 
excessive speculative foreign capital inflows and led to the crisis.  Foreign capital was 
used in unproductive investments, to finance an unsustainable boom in asset prices and 
property valuations.  This created asset bubbles within the property and stock markets 
and left the domestic banking system exposed to high risk once the bubbles burst.  He 
also argues that policy errors by the affected governments and the initial IMF response 
exacerbate the crisis in the short term95.  
Woo states that investor panic was the cause of the Asian financial crisis.  The 
tightening of macroeconomic policies, particularly that of fiscal policy, which was 
advised by the IMF, was an inappropriate approach to the panic-induced crisis.  The 
shutting down of insolvent banks in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand should have 
been carried out in a manner that was sensitive to the possibility of triggering a bank 
run96. 
Neely sums up the arguments on the causes of the Asia economic crisis by placing 
them into two categories: the fundamentalist view and the panic view97.  The 
fundamentalist view holds that flawed financial systems were at the root of the crisis.  
This view focuses on how borrowing countries’ policies and practices caused the crisis.  
For example, most East Asia countries peg their currencies to the dollar.  This policy 
practice served them well until 1995 because it promoted low inflation, supported 
currency stability, and boosted exports.  However, the appreciation of the dollar against 
the yen and other major currencies after 1995 caused East Asia countries to lose their 
competitiveness in export markets.  Thus, the US dollar appreciation in 1995-1997 
contributed to the Asian economic crisis. 
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As the fundamentalist view focuses on the borrowers, the panic view focuses on 
the lenders.  Those who subscribe to the panic view believe that the absence of the 
macroeconomic imbalances typical of past crises illustrates problems with economic 
fundamentals.  A swift change in expectations was the catalyst for the massive capital 
outflows that triggered the crisis.  There are several factors to support the premise that the 
Asia economic crisis was panic-induced98:   
First, there were no clear warning signs indicating that the crisis was imminent.  
Second, the practices of international banks providing substantial loans without 
government guarantee or insurance to East Asia private firms and banks prior to the 
crisis, contradict the moral hazard argument that investors knowingly made bad deals, 
assuming that they will be bailed out by the government.  Third, during the crisis, East 
Asia countries suffered from the lack of credit, even viable domestic exporters with 
confirmed sales could not get credit, suggesting irrationality on the part of lenders.  
Finally, the trigger of the crisis was the sudden withdrawal of funds from the region, not 
the deflation of asset values as argued by fundamentalists. 
D. ASIAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
The Asian economic crisis caused a sharp reduction in real income of most East 
Asian states.  In 1998, the growth rate plunged from the crisis average of 6% to 10% to –
13.2% in Indonesia, -10.4% in Thailand, -7.5% in Malaysia, -6.7% in South Korea, and –
0.6% in the Philippines.  However, since 1999, these East Asian countries have managed 
impressive recoveries.  The growth rate rebounded.  South Korea grew 10.7% that year, 
while in the other countries, the growth rate ranged from 5.4% in Malaysia to 0.2% in 
Indonesia99 (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.   Adjustment of Real GDP Growth in East Asia100 (From: Asian Development 
Bank). 
 
Park and Lee argue that the factors contributing to the speedy recovery of East 
Asian economy can be categorized into two aspects: macroeconomic factors and the 
panic and balance sheet effect.  As far as the macroeconomic factors are concerned, they 
argue that large real depreciation, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and an 
improvement in the global economic environment contributed to the quick post-crisis 
recovery of the East Asian economies.  They also argue that East Asia region’s higher 
level of openness is an important structural factor driving the speedy adjustment.  With a 
relatively large trade sector and export-orientation, East Asian economies benefited from 
a large depreciation of the real exchange rate.  The flexibility in the East Asian labor 
market facilitated this speedy adjustment. 
Another macroeconomic factor that contributed to the speedy recovery of East 
Asian economies is the favorable external environment.  The global economy was strong 
in 1999.  The United States economy has been able to absorb a large amount of exports of  
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the East Asian economies.  The world economy as a whole in 1999 experienced growth.  
These developments strongly impacted the post- East Asia economic crisis, especially 
during the early years of recovery. 
The swift change in policy stance toward expansion in the macroeconomic policy 
management also provided support to the quick recovery of the East Asian economies.  
The easing of monetary and fiscal policy has quickened the pace of recovery.  This raised 
the controversial question of whether the IMF policy advice to tighten monetary and 
fiscal policy and maintain it for a period of time was too harsh, and had exacerbated the 
crisis.   
With regard to the panic and balance sheet effect, Park and Lee argue that the East 
Asian crisis has an aspect of a severe liquidity crisis caused by investor’s panic.  
Therefore, the initial sharper contraction and faster recovery are related to changes in the 
expectations of foreign investors and both domestic household and firms on the economic 
prospects of the East Asian economies.  When foreign investors began to lose confidence 
in East Asian economies, they withdrew their investments, and once the investor’s panic 
calmed down and foreign capital inflows resumed, the economies of East Asia rebounded 
to their long-term trend. 
Ito101 in his examination on the East Asia economies’ post 1997-1998 economic 
crisis, argues that only three years after the Thai currency crisis, most Asian economies 
seem to be growing back strongly.  China grew by about 8 percent in 2000, South Korea 
about 10 percent in 2000 and the Indonesia economy expanded by about 5 percent in 
2000.  He argues that weaknesses in the financial sectors undermined manufacturing 
successes.  Therefore, once the financial sector was strengthened, the East Asian 
economies were able to retain their sustainable growth.  By adopting an appropriate 
currency regime and strong financial supervision, East Asian economies managed to 
strengthen their financial and capital markets. 
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Yusuf points out that the recovery of the Asian economies started as early as 
1999.  The recovery was due to increasing intra-regional trade, higher oil prices that 
aided petroleum producers, and appreciation of the yen.102  He argues that East Asian 
countries began to rebound because of export demand from the United States and 
Western Europe, especially for electronics, and higher domestic fiscal spending.  By the 
end of 1999, the economies of East Asia attained a 4.1 percent growth and by 2000, East 
Asian economies attained almost 6 percent economic growth. 
Based on these scholars’ arguments, there is sufficient evidence that the Asian 
economies recovered by 1999.  The growth rates of most Asian economies have managed 
to achieve the rate of post-crisis.  It is argued that the Asian values practices such as 
“strong states”, government policies directing the economy and effective intervention by 
government in the capital market by the Asian government, appear to have contributed to 
the fast recovery of most East Asian economies.  There is evidence that Malaysia 
recovered much faster than Thailand or Indonesia, which adopted the IMF solutions.  The 
Malaysian government, among other actions, intervened in the economic situation.  The 
Malaysian government imposed capital control and instead of closing down insolvent 
companies, bailed them out by injecting more funds into the companies.  The Malaysian 
central bank issued directives to local banks to merge and form only six main local banks.    
E. DID THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS INFLUENCE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ASEAN+3? 
While growing interdependence among East Asian countries in the age of 
globalization has been further strengthening regional cooperation, the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis has awakened the urgent need for institutionalized cooperation and 
stronger economic integration that transcends the geographical distinction between 
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.103 
Some commentators argued that Asian economic crisis was a blessing in disguise.  
The Asian economic crisis is believed to have triggered the formation of the ASEAN+3, 
an economic cooperation forum between thirteen East Asian states, and a new form of 
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East Asia regionalism.  This section discusses whether the Asian economic crisis 
influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  In order to discuss this issue, the Social 
Construction Theory is used to argue that self-restraint and the common fate suffered by 
all East Asian states during the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis was a possible cause for 
the East Asian leaders to engage in a communicative process to find a solution to 
overcome their common problem. 
1. Social Construction Theory   
a. Master Variables 
Wendt argues that interdependence, common fate, homogenous culture, 
and self-restraint can be seen as independent variables instigating the states’ engagement 
in the collective identity formation104.  The first three variables (interdependence, 
common fate, and homogeneity) are active or efficient causes of collective identity.  The 
last (self-restraint) is an enabling or permissive cause.  
All four may be present in a given case, and the more they are present, the 
more likely a collective identity formation will occur.  However, all that is necessary for 
it to occur is one efficient cause combined with self-restraint.  In this context, self-
restraint not only means refraining or avoiding practice but also means overcoming the 
fear of being engulfed by the other105. 
b. Common Fate 
Actors face a common fate when their individual survival, fitness, or 
welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole106.  A common fate must be an 
objective condition rather than a subjective condition, because an objective condition can 
act as a cause of the formation of a collective identity, while, a subjective condition is 
constitutive of collective identity, not a cause.  Common fate is not the same thing as 
interdependence.  Interdependence derives from the interaction of two parties, while 
common fate is constituted by a third party, which defines the first two as a group.  An 
example of a common fate can be seen in the following statement: “Even though they did 
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not interact with each other, Native Americans suffered a common fate at the hands of 
Europeans, who constituted them as a group by representing them as savages and treating 
them accordingly.”107  Common fate is also being used to explain alliances.  Perceiving a 
common threat posed by growing German power in the nineteenth century, in 1893, 
France and Russia changed their foreign policy from hostility to alliance108. 
Applying the definition of common fate to the Asian economic crisis, it 
can be argued that East Asian countries suffered a common fate at the hands of currency 
speculators and foreign investors.  The East Asian countries were a group by their 
adherence to the philosophy of Asian values and the use of the Asian economic 
development model, which promoted paternalism, nepotism, cronyism and corruption.  
The currency speculators and foreign investors acted accordingly to their perceived belief 
during the Asian financial crisis that caused market panic.   
However, instead of currency speculators and foreign investors, some 
commentators believed that “Most East Asians feels that they were both let down and put 
upon by the West “109.  East Asian leaders perceived that outsiders were “ganging up” in 
their attempts to exploit the difficulties faced by the East Asian governments.  It is the 
perception of the need to do something collectively to counter the vulnerability to outside 
influence, as much as any substantial change in power relations that has driven the new 
quest for East Asian collaboration in the period since the Asian economic crisis110. 
In the quest for East Asian collaboration, political leaders in the region 
considered regionalism as a form of a self-help mechanism in times of crises.  The idea is 
well reflected in the statement by Thai Deputy Prime Minister Supachai: 
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We cannot rely on the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the 
International Monetary Fund but we must rely on regional cooperation111. 
The idea of regional integration and the effect of common fate suffered by 
East Asian countries are expressed clearly by Japan:  
If we are lax in these efforts towards integration, we may invite more 
region-wide upheavals similar to the currency crisis.  It is therefore 
important to understand how and in what sense this region, including 
Japan, is a community with common fate.112 
The argument by some commentators113 that the Asian economic crisis 
had fuelled the “politics of resentment” that helped to galvanize the regional government 
into action also provides the supporting argument that common fate has influenced East 
Asian leaders to engage in a communicative process that led to the establishment of the 
ASEAN+3.   
c. Self-Restraint 
Interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity are efficient causes of 
collective identity formation and thus structural change.  As these causes increase, actors 
will be more likely to engage in a communicative process, which make states less selfish 
and would increase cooperation.  This process can only proceed, however, if actors can 
overcome their fear of being engulfed, physically or psychically, by those with whom 
they would identify114.  What is best for the group is not always best for the individual.   
In order to overcome this egoistic behavior, actors must develop trust that their needs will 
be respected and not ignored or sacrificed by the group.  Providing incentives to the 
actors can develop this trust. 
By holding ourselves back, we make it possible for others to step forward 
and identify with us, enabling us, in turn, to identify with them.  This does not by itself 
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generate collective identity, since without positive incentives to identify self-restraint, 
may simply lead to indifference.  Beside external factors, such as military power or 
economic power, in other word coercive power, incentives are provided by other master 
variables: interdependence, common fate and homogeneity115.  
In the case of the formation of the ASEAN+3, the incentive to engage in 
the collective identity formation was the common fate of the Asian economic crisis.  The 
severity of the impacts of the crisis on the East Asian economies acted to erode egoistic 
behavior of individual states and increase the need to cooperate with or trust others.  
Some observers contend that cooperation with the ASEAN+3 could erode long held 
animosities and distrust in the long run and build confidence over time116.  With the 
economic crisis is over, cooperation toward economic excellent can be seen as incentives 
for East Asian states to work toward stronger cooperation.  Merely the size of the market 
of the EAFTA is an attractive factor to keep East Asia working toward its reality. 
The members of the ASEAN+3, especially Japan and China, have used 
self-restraint in the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  Obviously, whether common fate 
acted as incentive to spark this cooperation is fully known.  Perhaps other factors, such as 
economic interest or national interest, also contributed to the decision to create the new 
regional institution.  This question, however, will have to be the topic of further research. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The debate has been politically fraught.  At one extreme, advocates of an 
American-style liberal market system have blamed the political and business elites of the 
region.  The notion of “crony capitalism” has been used.  In reply, advocates of the 
particularity of the development experience of Asia, often summed up in terms of an idea 
of “Asian values”, have spoken of a Western politico-financial conspiracy to undermine 
Asia’s success as stated by Peter W. Preston117. 
In relation to the Asian values debate, critics of the philosophy claimed that the 
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Democracy has prevailed over the philosophy of Asian values118, or in other words, the 
free market economy has prevailed over the Asian economic model.  However, besides 
the criticism, the two most vocal proponents of the philosophy of Asian values, the 
former Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and the former Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, insisted that the philosophy of Asian values is not 
the caused of the crisis.  Lee insists that the philosophy of Asian values will help these 
countries recover, just as they helped economic growth in the past”,119 while Dr. 
Mahathir believed that some solutions to the crisis must entail employing the “Asian 
traditional style of government intervention” and the solution to the crisis should involve 
greater collaboration between Asian countries.120 
In 1999, as the result of the Asian economic crisis, the ASEAN+3 was established 
to protect East Asian economies121.  Advocates of the philosophy of Asian values, 
learned from their mistakes during and before the Asian economic crisis, reacted 
aggressively to protect their interests.  The reaction was in the form of closer economic 
cooperation among the Asian economies.  This development led to the establishment of 
the ASEAN+3.  Beeson commented that  
Certainly, the ASEAN+3 may provide a shell within which East Asian 
versions of capitalist organization may continue.  It may even provide a 
platform for a rearticulating of the so call ‘Asian values’ discourse which 
was such a prominent and distinctive part of Southeast Asia identity 
during the boom years122. 
This development may lead to more dynamic development in the East Asia 
region.  Some political scientists consider the ASEAN+3 to be a stepping-stone to East 
Asian Regionalism, including the possibility of the creation of an East Asia Free Trade 
Area (EAFTA), the world’s largest RTA123.   
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The formation of the ASEAN+3 clearly demonstrates that the philosophy of 
Asian value is a still relevant, even, after severely being discredited by the Asian 
economic crisis.  The leaders of East Asia realized they needed to collaborate to form an 
institution to protect Asian economies.  The IMF’s flawed advice made the situation 
worse, and led the Asian leaders to engage in the politics of resentment.  They strongly 
believed that East Asia could not rely on the West or Western-backed organizations to 
come to their rescue in their time of need.  East Asia will have to cooperate with each 
other to emerge from the economic crisis.  
East Asian leaders see the Asian economic crisis as their common fate and it has 
acted as a stimulus to a closer and stronger cooperation among the East Asia countries.  
The establishment of the ASEAN+3 indicates that Asians are willing to put aside their 
differences and cooperate with each other in order to achieve a greater goal124.  The 
establishment of the ASEAN+3 also portrays that Asians are willing to tolerate greater 
government participation or intervention in the running of their economies.  These 
attitudes are in accordance with the philosophy of Asian values.  
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IV. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF ASIAN VALUES AND EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 
For much of the 1990s, East Asian political leaders, academics and 
analysts claimed that, despite ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, there 
was an ‘Asian way’, and that specifically Asian values existed.  These 
values made the region unique, and proud to be different from ‘the West’. 
       - Koro Bessho125 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, most East Asian states were experiencing outstanding 
economic growth.  There was an increasingly strong voice advocating an Asian way of 
conducting politics and economics.  This voice represents an increased sense of 
autonomy and confidence on the part of many East Asians, especially those in power and 
who possess wealth.  The Asian values debate caused increasing tension between East 
Asians and Westerners126.  Some of the more aggressive proponents of the philosophy of 
Asian values challenged the “Anglo-American style of democracy”, arguing that such 
models were ineffective or unsuitable for and detrimental to economic development and 
political order, especially when employed in East Asia.  These proponents claimed that 
East Asian successes were the result of “Asian-style democracy” or, as some labeled it, 
“soft authoritarianism”.127  While, in the economic realm, the “Asian economic 
development model” has been argued to have brought economic success to the East 
Asian economies.   
The 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, however, appeared to severely discredit 
the proponents of the philosophy of Asian values.  Despite strong condemnations of the 
philosophy of Asian values, however, some commentators still believe that the 
philosophy is still relevant.  The question is whether this philosophy has led the leaders of 
East Asia to engage in closer cooperation and integration through their commitment in 
the activities of the ASEAN+3.  Some political scientists even see the ASEAN+3 as a 
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stepping-stone to East Asian Regionalism, including the creation of an East Asia Free 
Trade Area (EAFTA)128.  The fast recovery of many of the East Asian economies surely, 
as this argument goes, provides evidence to support the arguments for the Asian-style 
democracy or soft authoritarianism, and that the Asian economic development models are 
still relevant in East Asia in the future.   
This chapter explores the philosophy of Asian values and its influence on 
decision-making in the Asia region.  It also examines whether the arguments that the 
philosophy of Asian values is not about a clash of civilization or a battle between the 
West and the East, but is about spurring economic development and regional stability.  In 
addition, it also considers the arguments of those who believe that the philosophy of 
Asian values promotes paternalism, nepotism, cronyism and corruption.  The current 
development of East Asian regionalism is discussed as well. 
The first section of the chapter discusses the Asian values debate.  The current 
trend of East Asia Regionalism is then explored and finally a discussion concludes the 
argument of whether the philosophy of Asian values influenced the establishment of the 
ASEAN+3. 
B. THE DEBATE OVER ASIAN VALUES 
The former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed and Senior 
Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, are the two most assertive advocates of the 
philosophy of Asian values129.  Despite strong opposition to the Asian values argument, 
especially after the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998, both of them have argued that 
the philosophy of Asian values did not cause the Asian economic crisis.  Instead, they 
insist that the philosophy of Asian values helped these states to recover from the  
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economic crisis130.  On the other hand, some observers now claim that “Asian values”, 
far from explaining Asia’s economic success, lie at the root of the cronyism and 
corruption afflicting the region131.   
1. Did the Asian Economic Crisis Settle the Asian Values Debate? 
The Asian economic crisis almost crippled some Asian states and led to the 
collapse of some governments, including Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand.  
Thompson132 argues that the Asian values debate received international attention because 
of the assertion that Asian culture particularity justified the rejection of liberal democracy 
that was matched with impressive economic results.  He compares the philosophy of the 
government of Malaysia and Singapore with that of Imperial Germany’s “German way”.  
The Asian values discourse was part of an effort to de-politicize students, civil servants, 
professionals, and small-business owners.  In the case of Indonesia, the Asian economic 
crisis had caused dissatisfaction with the government.  The government could no longer 
justify their authoritarian policies and the people were no longer willing to tolerate such 
policies in the face of severe economic difficulties.  The philosophy appeared to be 
fragile in the face of economic difficulties. 
Milner expands this economic argument and commented that the Asian values 
philosophy was withering away as an outcome of the Asian economic crisis133.  Coyle 
notes, “the crisis will finally lay to rest this unquestioning worship of Asian values… 
capitalism in its free-wheeling, Anglo-Saxon variety is coming into its own”134.  
Fukuyama135 viewed the Asian economic crisis as the end of the Asian values argument; 
he stated that “what the current crisis will end up doing is to puncture the idea of Asian 
exceptionalism.  The laws of economics have not been suspended in Asia”.  
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The economic performance argument was flawed because this line of argument 
would also be true for a democratic government.  The toppling of a government because 
of bad economic performance can happen with any form of government.  Poor economic 
performance does not differentiate between political ideology and system.  The question 
is whether a particular system generates poor performance.  Woo notes that the Asian 
Economic crisis caused “political volcanoes to erupt in several countries”.136  The type of 
government did not appear to matter as both democratic (Thailand) and authoritarian 
(Indonesia) governments collapsed in the face of the crisis. 
Zuckerman decried the Asian economies for “crony capitalism”, ridiculing this as 
an inevitable byproduct of the philosophy of Asian values.  He further stated, “Asian 
values have become Asian liabilities”137.  During the Asian economic crisis, much was 
said about the close cooperation that existed between business and government in the 
region, and this is what is meant by “crony capitalism”.  The implication was that it was 
directly responsible for the crisis.  It is argued that if East and Southeast Asia had 
followed the market economics ‘rule of law’ and not interfered or remained distant in the 
relationship between business and government, the Asian economic crisis would not have 
happened.  This assertion is not accurate.  “Crony capitalism” was not directly 
responsible for the Asian economic crisis, but this “crony capitalism” was an outgrowth 
of the philosophy of Asian values and this contributed to the severity of the crisis.  
Krugman, a well-known economist, summed up his view on the causes of the 
Asian economic crisis, as “a punishment for Asian values, even if the punishment was 
disproportionate to the crime”.  He further stated that “crony capitalism” is the spirit that 
pushed Asia to the brink, and was the problem of moral hazard in lending, mainly 
domestic lending138.  Later in 1999, he changed his view and stated “…the Asian  
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economic crisis is less a matter of economic fundamentals than it was a case of a self-
fulfilling prophecy, of market panic that, by causing a collapse of the real economy, ends 
up validating it-self”139. 
Perkin also questions the accuracy of the “crony capitalism” assertion, in that 
“close business-government relations were one manifestation of a broader phenomenon, 
the reliance on personal relationships to provide business transactions with the security 
that is an essential component of any successful commercial system”140.  Perkin explains 
that historically, laws backed up by an independent judiciary achieved the security of 
business transactions in Europe and North America.  This development of the rule of law 
took many centuries.  However, there was no comparable development of this kind of 
legal system in East and Southeast Asia until it was brought in by the colonial powers, 
but few turned to these systems.  Therefore, commerce had to have something to 
substitute for the rule of law.  The substitute was achieved through the strengths of East 
Asia culture or the close personal relationships based on family ties, as well as ties that 
extended beyond the family.  He further states that although this system did create 
opportunities for corruption, the system itself was not inherently corrupt.  The system 
might create moral hazard that led to excessively risky and unwise investment behavior.  
He further adds that many kinds of insurance also create a moral hazard situation, but we 
do not conclude that we should abolish them.  Perkin believes that the philosophy of 
Asian values served the Asian economic development well for nearly half of a century.  
However, it may not be the case in the future, and East Asia needs to modernize its 
economic system base on the rule of law to meet greater challenges in the future.141 
Borrowing the idea of Paul Volker, former Chairman of the United States Federal 
Reserve Board, “crony capitalism” is bad regardless whether it is practiced in East Asia 
or in any other part of the world.  However, as some economists have argued, “crony 
capitalism” did not cause the Asian economic crisis.  While, the existence of cronyism 
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and paternalism may not have directly caused the Asian economic crisis, these practices 
may have exacerbated the crisis.  The severity of the crisis could have been reduced if the 
government had taken more drastic measures earlier at the onset of the crisis.  However, 
the close ties between the Asian government and private companies may have inhibited 
the debate for a strong response142.  
With respect to the assertion that the Asian values argument would wither away 
after the Asian economic crisis, Milner states  
…for many people the world has a Western flavor.  And the fact that a 
global economy seems to have failed Asian states makes it possible that a 
long ideological campaign that seeks to undermine the colonial heritage, 
and that has underpinned the ‘Asian values’ proclamations, may gain 
rather then lose momentum in the next decades143.   
East Asia, from this perspective, is externally vulnerable to economic dislocation 
and to political intervention from international financial institutions and the United 
States.  The IMF’s policy advice appeared to worsen, not improve, economic conditions.  
The perception that the IMF’s policy prescriptions were flawed fuelled a sense of 
resentment among East Asia states that sparked regional collective initiatives, including 
the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  The ASEAN+3 may, as this argument goes, provide 
a shell within which East Asia versions of capitalism may continue.  The ASEAN+3 may 
also provide an insulated platform for a re-articulation of the Asian values discourse aids 
an environment within which distinctively Asian development projects can be taken 
up.144  
The philosophy of Asian values, from the perspective of several researchers, will 
continue to dominate the Asian style of governance as well as to influence economic 
practices in Asian economies.  If taken in a positive manner, these arguments highlight 
the positive aspects of the philosophy of Asian values as a tool for cooperation and  
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integration among Asian states.  The difficulties faced by Asian states during the Asian 
economic crisis appear to have heightened the need for closer cooperation and 
integration. 
Many western observers, on the other hand, do not understand the philosophy of 
Asian values.145  The Asian values debate thus tends to focus primarily on the 
relationship between Asian economic performance and the Asian system of governance.  
Some researchers argue that the inherent bias of Western commentators and researchers 
towards Western styles of governance and development models led to the inevitable 
conclusion that proponents of the philosophy of Asian values were supporters of 
authoritarian regimes.  The debate tends to linger around the abuses of human rights, 
cronyisms, paternalistic behaviors and illiberal practices of Asian governments.  In short, 
most Western commentators accused Asia’s authoritarian governments of using the Asian 
values debate to legitimize their illiberal practices.  These accusations were founded on 
the principles of Western liberalism and were not culturally sensitive to the unique nature 
of the Asian people and the region146.  From this perspective, the debate on the 
philosophy of Asian values has just begun. 
To sum up the arguments of the scholars, the tremendous impact of the Asian 
economic crisis on the ASEAN states casts doubt on the philosophy of Asian values.  
While many expected the philosophy of Asian values to be cast aside in light of the 
financial and economic crisis, it appears the opposite has occurred.  East Asia states are 
cooperating more closely now than prior to the crisis.  The establishment of the 
ASEAN+3 suggests that the debate on the philosophy of Asian values is far from over.  A 
new form of East Asia regionalism and multilateralism is emerging in the region as the 
result of the Asian economic crisis.  The philosophy of Asian values will shape the future 
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C. EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 
In short, for the foreseeable future, East Asia will be marked by a form of 
‘reactionary regionalism’ in which regional initiatives are designed to mediate and 
moderate external influences [especially by the United States]147. 
During the 1990s, the East Asia region witnessed an increase in multilateral 
security and economic dialogues and institution building activities.  APEC was formed in 
1989, ARF in 1994 and ASEM in 1996.  However, the enthusiasm for multilateralism in 
the region faded temporarily, as the result of the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, which 
demonstrated that Asian institutions were not geared to handling a major regional 
crisis148.  Neither APEC nor ASEAN could provide much assistance to those countries 
that were in trouble during the crisis.  On the other hand, the Asian economic crisis may 
have been a blessing in disguise to the Asian states.  Despite the negative effects of the 
crisis on Asian economies, one of the positive effects of the Asian economic crisis is that 
it is seen as a catalyst for the formation of the ASEAN+3 and increased bilateral trade 
agreements between Northeast Asia states and ASEAN’s states.  These developments can 
be seen as a stepping-stone for new East Asian regionalism.   
Other observers see the developments in East Asia as less significant.  The 
ASEAN+3 like other East Asia regional organizations promises much, but has delivered 
relatively little so far149.  Like APEC, the ASEAN+3’s adherence to the “ASEAN Way” 
of consensus and voluntarism would likely make the development of effective and 
binding regional initiatives more difficult.  The different policy positions and long-
standing regional rivalries between Japan and China also make East Asia cooperation 
more difficult.  Finally, the most important factor is that East Asia’s development 
emanates from outside the region, that is, East Asia tends to serve the needs of the 
economies of the United States and European Union.  
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Ravenhill150 seem to agree with Beeson’s “Reactionary Regionalism” argument, 
in that the new collaboration between Asian states has produced only modest results.  
Neither an East Asian preferential trade agreement nor an Asian Monetary Fund is likely 
to materialize.  The underlying power realities and fundamental economic interests are 
unchanged.  Even though Ravenhill agreed that the constructivist perspectives were 
persuasive in arguing that the financial crisis had promoted the sense of shared identity in 
East Asia, he stated that the effects of the economic crises have not led to a dramatic 
departure from East Asia’s previous policies.   
While Acharya151 did not reject the emergence of the ASEAN+3 as one of the 
outcomes of the crisis, he discussed in greater detail the consequences of the Asian 
economic crisis on Asia-Pacific regionalism and multilateralism.  He stated that even 
without the Asian economic crisis, skeptics about the achievement of Asian multilateral 
institutions had raised many questions.  There are several reasons for the negative 
assessment.  ASEAN, APEC and ARF have acquired a reputation for being more “talk 
shop” institutions, with little to show in terms of concrete policy initiatives and action.  
The failure of these institutions to take effective action during the Asian economic crisis 
and the East Timor problem indicate the weakness of the ASEAN Way decision-making 
process and the principle of non-interference.  The ASEAN Way, which was built upon 
strong inter-personal ties among its founders, has been diluted by generational change 
and membership expansion.  The non-interference principle in the internal affair of states 
was severely criticized and has caused a division among its members: those who are loyal 
to the old principle and those who call for a more active role of ASEAN and ARF in 
regional affairs.  The latter seek to replace the old doctrine with the “constructive 
engagement” method.   
Acharya have identified four main characteristics of regionalism and 
multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific during its formative years.  These include: (1) the 
importance of “soft power” over structural or hegemonic leadership; (2) the preference 
for “soft institutionalism” over legalistic and formalistic cooperation; (3) the roles of 
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norms and identity in institution building; and (4) state-centrism.  However, these 
characteristics were strongly questioned as a result of the Asian economic crisis, and 
there have been changes to these characteristics to reflect broader and more long-term 
geopolitical and economic transformations in the international system.   
As regards the ASEAN+3, Acharya argues that the concept faces a number of 
serious obstacles.  The most problematic is that neither China nor Japan seems to be 
willing to accept the level of engagement in this forum expected of them by ASEAN.  
Therefore, in view of the fact that two of the major players in the ASEAN+3 framework 
seem reluctant to meet ASEAN’s expectations, not much can be expected of this forum in 
the immediate future.  
While Beesons, Ravenhill and Acharya have provided strong and convincing 
arguments, they have underestimated the significance, strength and flexibility of the 
culture in institution building.  Ravenhill underestimated the constructivist argument 
without giving clear evidence to support his argument, while Acharya underestimated the 
willingness of China and Japan to cooperate with each other as well as with ASEAN.  
The Asian economic crisis had created a sense of interdependence among East Asian 
states, suffering a common fate that caused East Asia states to realize that they need each 
other to overcome problems of such magnitude and to put aside their differences.  They 
cannot totally rely on external assistance, but need to cooperate with those who share 
common values, identity, priorities and beliefs to solve the common problem.  
Contrary to the Beesons, Ravenhill and Acharya arguments, Stubbs believes that 
the ASEAN+3 has the potential to become the dominant regional institution in East 
Asia152.  He argues that the emergence of the ASEAN+3 was due to three key 
developments: the success of other regional organizations and arrangements like the 
European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the 
limitation of ASEAN and APEC to act as the key regional player to help East Asia states 
during the Asian economic crisis; and the impact of the Asian economic crisis have been 
enhancing the significance of the ASEAN+3 process. 
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The ASEAN+3 was not something that emerged out of the blue.  It is considered 
the latest manifestation of the evolutionary development of East Asia regional 
cooperation.  There were several proposals prior to the ASEAN+3.  In 1970, South Korea 
called for an Asian Common Market, in 1988, Japan suggested an Asian Network, and 
the immediate precursor was the East Asia Economic Caucus, proposed by the former 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, in 1990.  Stubbs, in analyzing the 
evolution of the long-term trends of East Asia regionalism, argues that Asian culture and 
values are the key factors that push the East Asia Identity forward.  
Stubbs also argued that the Asian economic crisis was the major catalyst in 
institutionalizing the ASEAN+3153.  He listed three reasons for his assertion.  First, it 
added to the sense of a common history that has emerged in the region as the result of the 
repercussions and the fallout from the crisis.  Second, it demonstrates the inability of 
APEC and ASEAN to provide assistance to troubled states during the crisis.  Third, the 
crisis fueled what Richard Higgott has called “the politics of resentment”154.  He also 
describes the effects of the IMF’s and U.S. government’s failure to appreciate the unique 
characteristics of the Asian currency crisis which led to the misdiagnosis of the problem 
and provided incorrect solutions that exacerbated the situation.   
Finally, Stubbs explains that the main obstacles, which will impede the 
development of the ASEAN+3, are rooted in the many variations to be found in the 
societies and economies of the East Asian countries.  He argues that these obstacles are 
unlikely to slow down ASEAN+3’s growth.  He also predicts that the U.S. government 
might revert to its policy on the EAEC and try to subvert the development of the 
ASEAN+3. 
Higgott argues that the crisis needs to be interpreted in an ideological fashion, 
reflecting a Western conceptual inability to deal with the resistance of the Asian model of 
economic development.  He discusses the policy remedies that emanated from the IMF.  
As with Stubbs, Higgott believed that the policies will not be appreciated in the long run 
and caused politics of resentment among Asian states and caused them to come together 
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as a closer regional identity.  He also offers evidence that the crisis has enhanced East 
Asia economic cooperation and portrays the limits of APEC.  Asian leaders, he argued, 
concluded that the IMF and U.S. government misdiagnosed the Asian economic crisis 
and provided solutions that exacerbated the situation and led to enhanced development of 
Asian regionalism.  
Ong155 examined the potential creation of EAFTA, which is one of ASEAN+3’s 
proposed activities.  He stated that EAFTA is the world’s largest potential RTA.  He 
argues that the Northeast Asian countries were forced to review their foreign trade 
policies and consider the merit of expanding trade because of developments in the past 
four years.  He listed the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis as the first development.  The 
second development is the rapid development of FTAs in other parts of the world.  The 
third development is the rapid expansion within Asia and the fourth development is the 
uncertainty about the future of a multilateral framework.  As regards the first 
development, he stated that “the shocking domino effect of the crisis revealed the high 
degree of interdependence and interconnectivity among Asian economies, causing these 
Asian nations to belatedly recognize the overwhelming impact of globalization.”   
Given these four developments and Higgott’s “politics of resentment” argument, 
it can be concluded that the establishment of the ASEAN+3 and its activities are an 
indication of closer cooperation between its members.  It provides the evidence that 
Asian regionalism is moving forward positively.  However, there are five main obstacles 
to the development of the ASEAN+3 as listed by Richard Stubbs.156  First, foreign 
agencies, especially the IMF, and foreign powers, notably the U.S., are blamed in some 
quarters for Asia’s economic and social troubles and this has led to a resurgence of 
nationalist sentiment.  Second are the domestic political conflicts and internal problems.  
Third, conflicting interest among the ASEAN+3 members could constrain the extent to 
which cooperation takes place.  Fourth, a series of bilateral FTAs between ASEAN+3  
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members could provide an alternative cooperation arrangement to ASEAN+3 regionalism 
and fifth, the U.S. government might revert to its policy on the EAEC and try to subvert 
the development of the ASEAN+3.  
Based on the examination of the arguments mentioned above, the philosophy of 
Asian values survived the impact of the Asian economic crisis.  Instead of the assertion 
that the Asian economic crisis would bring an end to the Asian values debate, it has 
added a new perspective to the debate: the emergence of East Asia regionalism.  The 
establishment of the ASEAN+3 raised a question of whether the philosophy of Asian 
values has a role to play in new developments in the region.  
D. DID ASIAN VALUES INFLUENCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
ASEAN+3? 
With respect to the relationship between culture and institutions, Daniel 
Etounga-Manguelle says ‘Culture is the mother; institutions are the children’.157 
The establishment of the ASEAN+3 in 1997 marked the emergence of a new East 
Asia regionalism.  This section discusses whether the philosophy of Asian values 
influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  The Social Construction Theory is used 
to argue that homogeneity is a possible cause for the East Asian states to engage in a 
communicative process.  The philosophy of Asian values, as part of the communicative 
process, is argued as having led to the establishment of the ASEAN+3158. 
According to Wendt, interdependence, a common fate, a homogenous culture and 
self-restraint can be seen as independent variables instigating states’ engagement in 
communicative processes159.  Wendt argues that homogeneity or alikeness can be 
understood in two relevant senses, in their corporate identities and their types of 
identities.  The first sense refers to the extent to which they are similar with respect to 
basic institutional form, function and causal powers.  As an example, states are not alike 
with non-state actors.  The second sense of homogeneity concerns type variation within 
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the corporate identity.  As an example, democratic states are not alike with authoritarian 
states.  The meaning of homogeneity, in the case of the Asian sovereign states, applies to 
the common political philosophy of Asian values.  Some might also argue that the 
majority of East Asia states are relatively homogeneous with respect to a mildly 
authoritarian government system and preference for a capitalist based economic system.  
Homogeneity also entails a subjective dimension in that states categorize themselves as 
being alike with regard to the features that define a group160. 
The types of regimes and cultural values will be examined to determine whether 
the East Asian states are homogeneous.  The practices of the “ASEAN Way” among East 
Asia states are also considered to determine whether the ASEAN Way promotes 
homogeneity.  
1. Type of Regime  
This section categorizes the East Asia states according to the type of regime they 
adopt: democratic government or authoritarian government.  In order to do this, the data 
obtained from the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World survey was utilized.  This 
organization conducts an annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties 
throughout the world to determine the political rights that enable people to participate 
freely in the political process.  Civil liberties include the freedoms to develop views, 
institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the states161. 
Analysis of the data below shows that only four countries: the Philippines, 
Thailand, Japan and South Korea are categorized as free as regards their political rights 
and civil liberties practices.  The other nine East Asia countries are categorized either 
partly free or not free.  Therefore, it can be concluded that in the majority of the East Asia 
countries, there are a lack political rights and limited civil liberties available to their 
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Table 2. East Asia States Freedom Ratings (1999 – 2000)162 (From: Freedom 
House).  
 
Country Political Right Civil Liberty Classification 
Malaysia 5 5 PF 
Singapore 5 5 PF 
Indonesia 4 4 PF 
The Philippines 2 3 F 
Thailand 2 3 F 
Brunei 7 5 NF 
Myanmar 7 7 NF 
Laos 7 6 NF 
Cambodia 6 6 NF 
Vietnam 7 7 NF 
Japan 1 2 F 
China 7 6 NF 
South Korea 2 2 F 
Source: Freedom House  
Legend:  
F – Free (1.0 - 2.5) 
PF – Partly Free (3.0 – 5.5) 
NF – Not Free (5.5 –7.0) 
 
Diamond classified types of governments or regimes into four categories.  The 
first is liberal democracies, the second, electoral democracies, the third, pseudo-
democracies and finally, the fourth is authoritarian regimes163.  Diamond describes 
liberal democracy as encompassing extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism 
as well as individual and group freedom.  This freedom and pluralism are protected by 
the rule of law that ensures all citizens have political and legal equality, and the state and 
its agents are subject to the law.  He argues that electoral democracy must at least meet 
the minimal requirements of a civilian as well as a constitutional system in which the 
legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, and 
multiparty elections with universal suffrage.   
Pseudo-democracies are less than minimally electoral democracies but are still 
distinct from purely authoritarian regimes.  There exist formal democratic political 
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institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, that masks the reality of 
authoritarian domination.  Finally, he argues that non-democracies or authoritarian 
regimes do not fulfill all or most of the characteristic of a democratic system.  Diamond 
categorized East Asian states as follows:  
 










  Malaysia  
   Singapore 
  Indonesia  
Philippines    
 Thailand   
   Brunei 
   Myanmar 
   Laos 
  Cambodia  
   Vietnam 
Japan    
   China 
South Korea    
 
Diamond’s characterizations show that most East Asian states are characterized as 
authoritarian regimes and pseudo-democracies.  Based on the two explanations above, it 
can be argued that most East Asian governments are adopting an authoritarian or pseudo-
democracy type of government.  In this sense, East Asian states are homogeneous in their 
form of government.  
Another aspect of East Asian states that appears to be homogenous is their system 
of economy.  Most East Asian states adopted the capitalist based economic system, and to 
be more specific, they adopted the Asian economic development model165.  This 
economic model is unique to the East Asian economies.  
The homogeneity of East Asian politics and economics system makes the 
communicative process amongst East Asians much easier.  They are able to identify 
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themselves as belonging to the same group.  This is clearly expressed by the Malaysian 
Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade Rafidah Aziz during the debate about whether 
Australia and New Zealand are part of the East Asia region and should be included in the 
establishment of the institution that Northeast and Southeast Asia are integral members of 
a broader concept.  She stated they are not [part of] East Asia.  They will have to fit into 
the APEC process.166 
It can be argued that geographically Australia and New Zealand are within the 
East Asia region.  However, politically, economically and culturally, Australia and New 
Zealand are not Asian.  This argument, to put it mildly, shows that culture and values 
plays an important aspect in the formation of a collective identity.   
These facts also are in accordance with the assertion of the philosophy of Asian 
values, which claimed that Asians have a greater concern for the economic well being 
than civil liberties and human rights.  Asian are supposedly communitarian rather than 
individualist, and place the welfare and collective good of the community over individual 
rights167.   
2. ASEAN Way 
Another aspect that is alike amongst East Asian states is the practices of the 
ASEAN Way in their intra and inter-regional relationship.  To recap, the ASEAN Way is 
a distinctive approach to inter-state relations and regional cooperation.  It consists of the 
avoidance of formal mechanisms and legalistic procedures for decision-making, and 
reliance on consultation and consensus to achieve collective goals.  The ASEAN Way 
also emphasizes quite diplomacy and rejection of adversarial posturing in negotiations168.  
East Asian states, in their interaction in regional institutions such as ARF, APEC, ASEM 
and the ASEAN+3, adopt the ASEAN WAY in their decision-making process169.  
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Even though the ASEAN Way has been criticized for being ineffective and 
causing a lack of action by the ASEAN and APEC to assist East Asians that were in 
economic difficulties, especially during the Asian economic crisis, it remains relevant to 
East Asians as a tool in their intra and inter-regional interactions.  More importantly, the 
practice of the ASEAN Way by East Asian countries has led them to identify themselves 
as belonging to the same group with common values and practices. 
Frequent interaction amongst the leaders of East Asian states in these forums and 
compliance with the same norms and practices (the ASEAN Way) can shape the East 
Asian identity.  The interactions and practices reduce diversity and accentuate 
homogeneity, especially in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres.  Archarya 
argues that region identity can be formed through a diffusion of norms, policies and 
practices of regional organizations and associations, formal or informal.  Regional 
organizations can promote common ideologies and political values, adopt convergent 
development policies, facilitate their implementation, and take steps to reduce inequality 
among members.  This he argues could produce greater homogeneity and commonality 
that are essential to regional identity170.  
To sum up the discussion in this section, homogeneity on its own is not sufficient 
to cause states to engage in a communicative process to form a collective identity.  
However, homogeneity, coupled with a common fate, will act as an effective stimulus to 
encourage or force states to engage in a communicative process, especially when their 
existence is at stake.  Examples to illustrate this point can be seen in the case of the 
European monarchies where they were very homogenous and fought wars for centuries, 
but only when facing the common threat of domestic revolution did their homogeneity 
become a basis for collective action in the Concert of Europe171.  On the other hand, 
despite a common language, religion, and pan-Arab ideology, Arab states have shown 
little unity, especially after they consolidated territorial sovereignty172. 
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The examples above demonstrate that the homogeneity argument is not absolute.  
However, one must not dismiss homogeneity altogether as a cause of the formation of 
collective identity, if other things being equal, homogeneity facilitates consensus by 
reducing conflict and increasing the ability to recognize oneself and others as belonging 
to the same group. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Proponents of the philosophy of Asian values claimed that the East Asia 
economic boom in the 1990s was the result of the adherence to Asian values and the 
Asian economic development model.  Many advocates of a liberal democracy and free 
market economy do not accept this argument.  They claim that Asian values are a tool for 
legitimizing authoritarian regimes.  It is merely a creation of Asian elites to justify their 
authoritarian practices in order to remain in power.  In 1997, the Asian economic miracle 
ended abruptly.  The crisis severely discredited the Asian values argument.  It left little 
doubt in the minds of many observers that the Asian economic crisis marked the end of 
the Asian values debate.  The Asian economic crisis has revealed the hypocrisy of the 
philosophy of Asian values by exposing the underlying weaknesses of the Asian 
economy.  The practices of the philosophy of Asian values created crony capitalism, 
which some commentators believed was the cause of the Asian economic crisis.  The 
effects of the Asian economic crisis caused a change of government in Indonesia and 
Thailand.   
A strong belief in the philosophy of Asian values and the effect of the Asian 
economic crisis, which was seen as a common fate suffered by East Asia states, led the 
Asian governments to realize the need for closer cooperation among themselves. In 1999, 
the ASEAN+3 was established as a mechanism to deter the crisis from reoccurring in the 
future.  This marked the beginning of a new East Asia regionalism.  The ASEAN+3 has 
managed to spark a dynamic development in the East Asia region.  The ASEAN+3 is 
working towards the possible creation of the world’s largest Regional Trade Area - the 
EAFTA.  How successful the ASEAN+3 will be in the future remains to be seen. 
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The speedy recovery of the East Asia economy started as early as 1999, only after 
less than two years of economic difficulties.  This quick recovery raised questions as to 
the actual cause of the crisis.  It also challenges the accuracy of the critiques of the Asian 
economic development model.  The assertion made by some commentators that the 
philosophy of Asian values breeds “crony capitalism” that caused the Asian economic 
crisis is flawed.  Instead, besides favorable external factors, such as a strong global 
economy and a high import rate from the United States, the strong belief in the 
philosophy of Asian values and the perseverance of the East Asians to overcome the 
economic crisis helped in the speedy recovery of their economies. 
With the East Asia economy already recovered, coupled with the new Asian 
regionalism, whether East Asia will experience another economic miracle in the future is 
yet to be seen.  The philosophy of Asian values will remain relevant to East Asia 




Cultural factors and influences…loom large…human cultural traits vary 
greatly around the world.  Some of that cultural variation is no doubt a 
product of environmental variation. …but an important question concerns 
the possible significant of local cultural factors unrelated to the 
environment.  A minor cultural factor may arise for trivial, temporary 
local reasons, become fixed, and then predispose a society toward more 
important cultural choices.  …their significance constitutes an important 
unanswered question.173 
In the last three decades, the world has seen two significant events occur in the 
East Asia region.  Some argued that the first event makes many East Asians feel proud to 
be Asian, while the second event, to an extent, brought shame to Asians.  The Asian 
economic miracle and the Asian economic crisis have caused the East Asia region to be 
the subject matter of many discussions and research around the world.  The main focal 
point in these discussions and research is the philosophy of Asian values.  Questions such 
as does culture really matter, and does culture affect human development, are often being 
asked.  This thesis has, in its own way, provided some of the answers to those questions.  
Culture does matter and significantly influences human development.  Culture could be 
equated to a double-edged sword.  If used correctly, it will work to your benefit, but, on 
the other hand, if misused, it could hurt you.  The Asian economic miracle and Asian 
economic crisis is a good realization of the double-edged sword analogy.   
In order to recover from the injuries suffered during the Asian economic crisis, 
some argued it has led East Asians to put aside their differences and come together to 
form a new regional institution, the ASEAN+3.  This new regional institution has 
managed to bring all Northeast Asia states and Southeast Asia states to the same 
negotiating table.  Interestingly, the ASEAN+3 has, for the first time, brought China and 
Japan to the same table.  
 
                                                 
173 Jared Diamond, 1997, “Guns, Germs, and Steel”, New York: Norton, pp. 417-419.  
67 
There has been an increase in bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation 
between and among East Asian states subsequent to the formation of the ASEAN+3.  The 
idea of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) has been discussed extensively.  If this 
idea can transpire in the near future, it will significantly impact the future outlook of the 
global economy. 
This chapter concludes the discussion on whether the philosophy of Asian values 
and the Asian economic crisis stimulated the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  The 
second section of the chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis questions, 
highlighting the relevancy of the philosophy of Asian values and the Asian economic 
development model to the East Asia region.  Finally, recommendations for the 
development of the ASEAN+3 are provided as well as suggestions for areas of future 
research on this topic. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Two questions were raised when embarking on this study.  The first was, whether 
the Asian economic crisis influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3, and the second 
is whether the philosophy of Asian values influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  
These two issues are so intertwined that it is nearly impossible to discuss one issue 
without encroaching into a discussion of the other, which is evidenced during the 
discussions in Chapters III and IV.  An attempt was made to distinguish between the two 
issues during the discussion in this thesis to the extent possible.  
The discussion on the topic of the Asian economic crisis highlighted arguments 
by some commentators for and against the Asian economic development model, the 
discussion on the causes of the economic crisis, its recovery and finally the discussion on 
the relationship between the Asian economic crisis and the establishment of the 
ASEAN+3. 
The argument against the Asian economic development model can be summarized 
as the Asian economic development model is based on a flawed financial system.  The 
model promotes paternalism, nepotism, cronyism and corruption, or in short, it created 
“crony capitalism”.  This moral hazard undermined the efficient running of East Asia  
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economies.  Government interventions in the market caused the lack of initiative and 
transparency in business dealings by private and public businesses.  These moral hazards 
to an extent caused the Asian economic crisis.   
On the other hand, the arguments for the Asian economic development model 
claimed that “crony capitalism” was not the cause of the Asian economic crisis.  Instead, 
they claimed it was caused by market panic.  The swift change in expectations by 
investors was the catalyst for massive capital outflows that triggered the crisis in 
Thailand and quickly spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea.  
The East Asia countries were too slow to fully respond to the rapidly globalizing 
financial markets and failed to formulate appropriate actions.  Some believed that the 
severity of the crisis could have been reduced if the East Asian governments had taken 
more drastic measures earlier in the crisis.  
As regards the discussion of Asian economic recovery, it is argued that the 
recovery started as early as 1999, and by 2000, the East Asian economies had rebounded 
to their pre-crisis growth rate of six to ten percent per annum.  This impressive recovery 
of Asian economies shed some light on the argument of the causes of the Asian economic 
crisis.  Besides external factors, such as a strong global economy and increased exports of 
East Asian goods by the United States during the early period of recovery, the practices 
of the philosophy of Asian values such as “strong states” capable of implementing 
policies directing the economy and effective intervention by governments in the capital 
market, appear to have contributed to the quick recovery of most Asian economies. 
As regards the relationship between the Asian economic crisis and the 
establishment of the ASEAN+3, the economic crisis had played a significant role in 
influencing the leaders of East Asia to engage in communicative processes, which led to 
the establishment of a new institution, the ASEAN+3.  East Asians saw the Asian 
economic crisis as a result of a common threat to their economic well-being.  East Asians 
believed that the West was ganging up on them to undermine the East Asian economies.  
The flawed policy advised by the IMF exacerbated the economic crisis, and was used as 
evidence to support this belief.  This stimulated that the East Asian leaders were to 
engage in a “Politics of Resentments”.  East Asians, realizing that they were facing a 
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common threat and would suffer a common fate if they failed to take proper action, 
despite their differences, cooperated to establish the ASEAN+3.  This new institution is 
believed to be a mechanism to bring about closer cooperation amongst East Asians in the 
political, economic, social and cultural arena.  The long-term vision of the ASEAN+3 is 
to create an East Asian community.   
To conclude the discussion of the Asian economic crisis, it can be argued that the 
Asian economic development model would remain relevant and important to East Asian 
economies in the future.  However, because of the Asian economic crisis, some 
fundamental principles of the model seem questionable and need to be revised or 
modified.  The causes of the Asian economic crisis almost certainly follow the panic-
induced theory.  However, “crony capitalism” must be avoided in order for East Asians to 
compete successfully in the fast and fluid global market economy in the future.  Finally, 
the Asian economic crisis no doubt influenced the establishment of the ASEAN+3. 
The second question that was discussed in this thesis is whether the philosophy of 
Asian values stimulated the establishment of the ASEAN+3.  The discussion on this topic 
covers the debate over the philosophy of Asian values and East Asian regionalism.  The 
discussion about the debate over the philosophy of Asian values examined whether the 
Asian economic crisis settled the debate over Asian values.  Many western commentators 
believed that the Asian economic crisis marked the end of the debate.  They claimed that 
the liberal democracies and free market economy prevailed over the philosophy of Asian 
values and the Asian economic development model.  The severity of the Asian economic 
crisis caused tremendous negative effects not only on Asian economies but it also 
affected the political stability of some Asian countries, as well as their social and cultural 
lives.  Most commentators were convinced that this was the end of the debate and that the 
philosophy of Asian values would “wither away” claimed a western commentator.   
Instead of withering away, the opposite has occurred with the leaders of East Asia 
coming together to form a new regional institution, the ASEAN+3.  This development 
triggered more bilateral and multilateral arrangements between and among East Asia 
states.  The idea of an East Asia Free Trade Area was discussed and studied at the 
ASEAN+3 summit meeting.  There is a possibility that this idea may become a reality.  
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Some commentators see the establishment of the ASEAN+3 as reactionary regionalism 
and some called it the politics of resentments.  The East Asian leaders, perceiving that 
Asian economies are under a common threat, call for a united East Asia to fight against 
this common enemy.  Homogeneity seems to be basis for the formation of the ASEAN+3 
since Australia and New Zealand were not included as members even though 
geographically these two countries are within the East Asia region.    
To conclude the discussion on the second issue, it can be argued that the Asian 
economic crisis did not settle the debate.  The Asian economic crisis has made East 
Asians realize that they need each other to overcome a crisis of such magnitude.  This led 
to the establishment of the ASEAN+3, and the potential creation of EAFTA, the world’s 
largest RTA.  The philosophy of Asian values is not merely a set of common norms but a 
set of values that affects policies.  It will play a role in shaping the development of the 
ASEAN+3 in the future.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations need to be given consideration in the 
development of the ASEAN+3.  
• All ASEAN+3 members must adhere to the ASEAN Way and the 
principle of non-interference in its intra and inter-state interactions, 
especially during its early stages of development so as to avoid the 
creation of unnecessary tension.   
• The philosophy of Asian values must be recognized officially by the 
ASEAN+3 and included in its governing documentation.   
• The Asian economic development model must not tolerate corruption and, 
rules and regulations must be established to make public dealings, and to 
an extent, make private dealings transparent.     
• The Chiang Mai Swap Arrangement must be developed further to provide 
for greater capability to react to the attack of currency speculators. 
• The establishment of EAFTA needs to be speeded up. 
• The ASEAN+3 summit must be renamed to East Asia Summit in order to 
help build an East Asia community. 
• The ASEAN+3 must work toward the establishment of an Asia Monetary 
Fund in order for East Asia to be more independent of external factors that 
can undermine the unity of its formation.  
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Finally, research on the possibility of the creation of the EAFTA and East Asia 
community would provide researchers with further arguments relating to the advantages 
and disadvantages of the philosophy of Asian values.    
D.  CONCLUSION 
The philosophy of Asian values will remain relevant to East Asians in the future.  
These values must be nurtured for them to be appreciated by the younger generations in 
the future.  The philosophy of Asian values is not merely a set of common norms but a 
set of values that affect policies.  The philosophy of Asian values must not be seen as 
static but must be pragmatic and take into consideration the fast development-globalizing 
world.  East Asians must preserve their Asian cultural values, and at the same time, strive 
to achieve modernization.  It must not be wrongly interpreted that one must be sacrificed 
in order to achieve the other.  Political, economic and cultural values must be 
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